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Abstract
The AM & S Europe judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union was the first
ruling on the principle of confidentiality. Part I will deal with certain facets of the principle of
confidentiality, not considered by the Court, in the light of a comparative analysis of the laws of the
Member States. Finally, part II will analyse the impact of the Court’s ruling on both Community
and national laws and briefly discuss the implications of the judgment for lawyers from third
countries.

PROTECTION OF LEGAL PRIVILEGE IN
EEC COMPETITION LAW: THE
IMPERFECTIONS OF A CASE
Theofanis Christoforou*
INTRODUCTION
In implementing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community' (EEC Treaty) the
Commission of the European Communities (Commission) may
undertake all necessary investigations into undertakings and
associations of undertakings operating in the European Economic Community (Community or EEC). Pursuant to article
14(1) of Regulation 17/622 (Regulation 17), the officials
authorised by the Commission are empowered to examine the
books and other business records of the undertakings and associations of undertakings, to take copies of or extracts from
the books and business records, to ask for oral explanations on
the spot, and to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings.
In February 1979 the Commission department responsible for competition policy decided to conduct an investigation
at the premises of AM & S Europe Limited (AM & S Europe) in
order to ascertain the competitive conditions concerning the
production and distribution of zinc metals.' The Commission
officials made a written request for the submission of certain
* Member of the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities. All opinions expressed in this paper are strictly personal. I am indebted to A.
Pappalardo for useful suggestions and comments. I would also like to express my
gratitude to the following colleagues and friends for their comments on early drafts
of this paper: C. Bail, B. Engwegen, F. Espion-Tobias, J. Faull, J. Temple Lang, B.
van der Esch and J-F. Verstrynge (all of the EEC Commission); L. Goffin (of the
Brussels Bar); and V. Korah (of University College, London). However, I alone am
responsible for the opinions expressed in the final text.
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973
GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-Il) (official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(1958) (unofficial translation) [hereinafter cited as "EEC Treaty"].
2. First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 5J.O. COMM.
EUR. 204, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401 (Feb. 6, 1962) [hereinafter cited as
"Regulation 17"].
3. AM & S is a company incorporated in the United Kingdom with premises at
Bristol and Avonmouth and is a subsidiary of Australian Mining and Smelting Limited; both companies, however, belong to the well-known "Rio Tinto Zinc" group.
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documents. AM & S Europe refused to comply, claiming that
the documents were covered by legal privilege, i.e., the principle of legal professional privilege, as understood in common
law jurisdictions, or confidentiality.
By decision of 6 July 1979, taken under article 14(3) of
Regulation 17, the Commission required AM & S Europe to
submit to further investigation at its premises and to produce,
inter alia, "all documents for which legal privilege is claimed. '"
AM & S Europe refused to show to the Commission's inspectors the entirety of the documents for which privilege was
claimed. A subsequent meeting held in Brussels between the
company and the Commission failed to resolve the dispute. As
a result an action for annulment under article 173 of the EEC
Treaty was brought by AM & S Europe against the Commission's decision. In its first judgment to be pronounced on the
question of confidentiality, the Court of Justice ruled inter alia
that: firstly, protection of confidentiality of certain written
communications between lawyer and client constitutes a general principle of law common to the laws of the Member States
and, as such, forms part of Community law; and secondly, protection of confidentiality will be assured in Community competition law only when the following three conditions are met:
(a) the written communications between lawyer and client are
made for the purposes and in the interests of the client's right
of defence; (b) the written communications emanate from independent lawyers, i.e., lawyers not bound to the client by a
relationship of employment; and (c) the written communications emanate from a lawyer who is entitled to practise his profession in one of the Member States and has acted within the
scope of Council Directive 77/249/EEC5 (Council Directive)
on the freedom to provide legal services."
4. Investigation of Zinc Producers for Violations of Competition Rules, 22 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 31, 33 (1979), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.

REP. (CCH)
10,153, at 10,473 (art. l(b) of the Commission Decision).
5. Council Directive 77/249/EEC, 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 78) 17 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as "Council Directive"].
6. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1575, [19791981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757. It should be noted that in
the case in question the United Kingdom and the Consultative Committee of the Bars
and Law Societies of the European Community intervened in support of the applicant's arguments. France intervened in support of the Commission. After AdvocateGeneral Warner had given his opinion of the case, the Court ofJustice took the unu-
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The AM & S Europe judgment was the first ruling on the
principle of confidentiality. It might be asking too much to expect the Court of Justice to have resolved all of the problems
to which the application of a principle of law as complicated as
the protection of confidentiality between lawyer and client
gives rise. This is especially true in view of the widely diverging approaches adopted in the laws of the different Member
States. Consequently, this study will seek to analyse those
parts of the Court's judgment which, in the author's opinion,
merit such analysis. Part I will deal with certain facets of the
principle of confidentiality, not considered by the Court, in the
light of a comparative analysis of the laws of the Member
States.7 Finally, part II will analyse the impact of the Court's
ruling on both Community and national laws and briefly discuss the implications of the judgment for lawyers from third
countries.'
I. PROTECTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONFIDENTIALITY IN EEC COMPETITION LA W
A. History, Legal Basis and the Scope of the
Principle of Confidentiality
In common law jurisdictions protection of legal privilege
is derived initially from consideration of "oath and honour" of
the lawyer rather than from apprehension of his client. The
foundation of the principle began to be conceived differently
at the end of the eighteenth century, however, and the law now
regards the privilege as that of the client rather than the lawyer."
It was said a long time ago that the protection of confidentiality
is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be
sual step of reopening the procedure and ordering the applicant to send to the
Court, in a sealed envelope, all documents for which legal privilege was claimed so
that they could be examined by the Court and a report could be drawn up. A second
opinion on the case was given by Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn. The Court of
Justice finally pronounced its ruling on 18 May 1982.
7. See inifra notes 9-141 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 142-81 and accompanying text.
9. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (MacNaughton
rev. 1961); see also Peiris, Legal Professional Privilege in Commonwealth Law, 31 INT'l. &
COMP. L.Q. 609 (1982).
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upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence,
in practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting
rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial
proceedings ....
[D]eprived of all professional assistance, a
man would not venture to consult any skillful person, or
would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case."'
The purpose of legal privilege today is, therefore, to foster full
and frank communication between clients and their lawyers
and, ultimately, to encourage lawful conduct and promote the
proper administration of justice.
In common law jurisdictions, discovery of documents by
the litigants in civil law procedure is widely admissible. In the
laws of most European Member States, however, such discovery is, as a rule, not only very limited but is also administered
by the Courts and not by individuals. Another difference between common law and civil jurisdiction lies in the fact that, as
a basic principle of criminal law and procedure in civil law jurisdictions, communications exchanged between an accused
person and his defence lawyer are confidential and immune
from disclosure. For this reason, protection of confidentiality
of communications between lawyer and client in Europe is
more closely related to the rights of defence of the accused
than it is in common law countries. A breach of the rule of
confidentiality is considered in almost all Member States to be
a criminal offence. In addition, protection of confidentiality is
seen in several Member States more as an obligation of the
lawyer than as a right of the client.' Finally, most of the Member States with civil law systems regard the rule of professional
secrecy as a principle of public order and also as a necessary
requirement for the proper administration of justice.
10. Greenough v. Gaskell, I My. & K. 98, reprinted in 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 621
(1833) (per Lord Chancellor Brougham).
11. For a useful analysis of the laws of the Member States, see D.A.O. Edward,
The Professional Secret, Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege in the Nine
Member States of the European Community, a report prepared for the Commission
Consultative des Barreaux de la Communaut6 Europ ene (1976) [hereinafter cited as
the "Edward Report"] (unpublished report available at the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities). See also AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 1651-53, 1656-58, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MIT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9077, 9081 (the opinion of Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn containing a
survey of the laws of the Member States).
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Generally speaking, the protection of legal privilege is the
result of a compromise between two competing interests:
1) the public interest, which requires that the administration of
justice be conducted on the basis of all available evidence, and
2) the right of the individual to have unfettered recourse to
proper legal advice and assistance with a view to safeguarding
his rights.
It should be stressed from the outset, however, that the
purpose of the privilege is not to conceal facts. It protects only
the confidentiality of communications and not the facts underlying communications between lawyer and client. Hence, it
does not stand in the way of any inquiry into disputed issues
but merely seals off one source of evidence concerning those
issues. In addition, it is well-established law that no adverse
inference should be made merely from the fact that privilege is
claimed.
At the time the AM & S Europe case was pending before
the Court of Justice, no express provision of Community law
afforded protection to legal privilege. The legislative history
of Regulation 17, as both Advocates-General remarked, provides no clear indications as to the Community draftsmen's intentions. The only assurance of protection is given in a Commission answer to a parliamentary question.'" In that answer,
the Commission decided not to use as evidence of infringement of Community competition rules certain papers considered to be strictly legal in nature. 3 The papers at issue were
written with a view to seeking or giving opinions on points of
law to be observed or relating to the preparation or planning
4
of the defence of a firm.'

The Court ofJustice of the European Communities (Court
of Justice or Court) acknowledged the existence of a gap in
Community competition law with regard to the protection of
confidentiality in the AM & S Europe case. It sought to fill this
gap by offering recourse to the general principles common to
the laws of the Member States. The Court defined the principle of confidentiality as serving "the requirements, the impor12. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 188) 30 (1978) (Written Question No. 63/78 by
J.P. Coust6).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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tance of which is recognized in all of the Member States, that
any person must be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of independent legal
advice to all those in need of it."' 5
Despite its general terms, this definition of the principle of
confidentiality seems to be closer to the rationale of legal privilege as understood in English law (fostering frank and full consultation between client and lawyer) and only partly reflects
the position of civil law countries. The Court further explained in Ground 20 of the AM & S Europe judgment that
"Whilst in some of the Member States [common law countries] the protection against disclosure afforded to written
communications between lawyer and client is based principally on a recognition of the very nature of the legal profession, inasmuch as it contributes towards the maintenance of
the rule of law, in other Member' States [civil law jurisdictions] the same protection is justified by the more specific
requirement (which, moreover, is also recognized in the
first-mentioned States) that the rights of the defence must
be respected."1"
However, as the Court also rightly pointed out, the rights of
defence are equally recognized as a ground for protecting legal
privilege in common law countries.' 7
Since the Court found that the scope of privilege and the
criteria for affording protection varied in the legal systems of
the Member States, it incorporated into Community law only
those criteria relative to the principle that were found to be
common to all Member States. Firstly, the Court found that
written communications between attorney and client should be
made for the purposes and in the interests of the client's rights
of defence; and secondly, that they should emanate from independent lawyers, i.e., lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment. A third condition'
15. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059 (Ground 18 of the Judgment).
16. Id. at 1610-11, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)

8757, at 9059 (Ground 20 of the Judgment).
17. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757.
18. While the Court ofJustice considered only the first two conditions necessary
for incorporation of the general principle of confidentiality into Community law, the
third condition is imposed by the structure of the EEC Treaty in the application of the
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which recognizes the provisions of the EEC Treaty on freedom
of establishment and freedom to provide services must also be
met before the protection of confidentiality will be applied.
The principle of confidentiality will be applied only when the
lawyer with whom the communications were exchanged is entitled to practise his profession in one of the Member States and
has acted, in the particular case in question, within the limits
determined by the Council Directive' 9 on the freedom to provide legal services.2 0
B. Extent of Protection under the Principle of Confidentiality
1. The Confidential Nature of the Communications as a
Criterion for Protection
A prerequisite for the protection of legal privilege has always been the confidential or secret nature of the communications exchanged between lawyer and client. No protection is
afforded to communications not made in confidence or to communications which were originally confidential but have subsequently lost that status. The Court of Justice very discreetly
acknowledged the necessity of this condition when it stated
that certain business records may be recognized as being of a
confidential nature.2 ' In general, the party claiming privilege
also bears the burden of establishing all the necessary elements, including the confidential nature of the communications.
Looked at objectively, the meaning of confidentiality is a
negative one, relative in terms of time and dependent on the
animus of the person concerned. Anything not generally
known or not known to an indefinite number of people but
only to one or certain given persons is confidential. Safeguarding the confidentiality of the communications is considered necessary to foster consultations between lawyer and client for the purpose of obtaining or furthering legal advice and
principle of confidentiality in practice. Id. at 1610, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059; see also id. at 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9060 (Ground 25 of the Judgment).
19. Council Directive, supra note 5.
20. 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1575, 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9060 (Ground 26 of the Judgment).
21. Id. at 1610, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757,
at 9059 (Ground 18 of the Judgment).
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assistance. Once the confidential nature has been destroyed or
lost, however, the rationale for affording the privilege in the
first place no longer applies.
In the situation where the same lawyer acts for two or
more parties having a common interest (i.e., undertakings
which have concluded an agreement within the meaning of article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty) and each party communicates
with the same attorney, these communications would seem to
preserve their confidential character at the instance of a third
person, such as the EEC Commission.22 From the Court's
judgment on the facts of the case it seems that the exchange of
legal memoranda between undertakings belonging to the same
group, or the mere filing of documents in the company's general files, will not rob the documents of their confidential character.
2. The Purpose For Which the Communications Were
Exchanged as a Criterion for Protection
With regard to the first of the three conditions mentioned
earlier,2 4 namely that the communications were made for the
purposes of and in the interests of the client's rights of defence, it is of paramount importance-before attempting to delimit the extent of protection-that the concept "rights of defence" be defined.
In the legal systems of most Member States, as in Community law, 2 5 observance of the rights of defence constitutes a
general principle of law. Certain manifestations of those
rights, such as the right to be heard, have progressively enjoyed explicit or implicit constitutional status. Observance of
the rights of defence is required in the process of adversaryproceedings in which sanctions, such as fines or penalties, may be
22. See mutatis mutandis, Heintz van Landewyck Sarl v. Commission, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3125, at 3239, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH)
8687, at 8184 (Ground 46 of the Judgment) [hereinafter cited as
"FEDETAB"].
23. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1614-15, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9058-59.
24. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
25. Hoffman - La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
461, 511, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8527, at 7538.
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imposed.2 "
In the sphere of Community competition law proceedings,
a provision has been made permitting undertakings and associations of undertakings to present their views and to defend
themselves effectively before the Commission takes a decision
affecting their rights or imposing fines and penalties. 7 The
content of those rights of defence is defined widely by the provisions of Regulation 99/6328 (Regulation 99).
It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that all
communications exchanged between lawyer and client which
are closely related to or were rendered necessary for the exercise of the rights referred to in Regulation 99, may be considered to be made for the purposes and in the interests of the
client's rights of defence.
In addition, communications exchanged between lawyer
and client in the course of certain other proceedings for the
adoption of interim measures by the Commission, on the principle laid down by the Court in the Camera Care case,2 9 will also
be covered by the principle of confidentiality in investigations
or proceedings to be brought subsequently by the Commission
or the opposing party. These communications will be considered to have been exchanged for the purposes and in the interests of the client's rights of defence.
Conversely, communications which are totally unrelated
to those right of defence, such as communications alien to the
subject-matter of the proceedings in question or exchanged as
part of friendly correspondence or aimed at assisting the client
to evade rather than to comply with the law, will not be covered by the principle of confidentiality. English law provides
for legal privilege in two principal areas. 3 0 Firstly, confidential
communications made for the purposes of pending or contem26. See, e.g.,Judgment of Mar. 13, 1981, Conseil d'Etat, Fr., 1982J.O. Nos. 14142, [1982] 1 GAZ. PAL. 278.
27. Regulation 17, supra note 2, at art. 17, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2582
(art. 19).
28. Regulation No. 99/63/EEC, 6 J.O. CoMM. EUR. 2268 (July 25, 1963).
29. See Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 119, [19791981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8645.
30. For obvious reasons, English law is assumed to represent the law on legal
privilege as it stands in common law jurisdictions. French law is assumed to represent confidentiality in continental legal systems. For a more detailed analysis of the
laws of all Member States, see supra note 11.
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plated litigation, if exchanged between the client or his lawyer
and a third party, are covered. 3 ' Secondly, confidential communications exchanged between a lawyer and client seeking or
providing legal advice are also covered, even though no litiga32
tion was contemplated by the client.
The position of French law, by contrast, is not entirely
clear. There is no doubt that the principle of confidentiality
protects communications exchanged between lawyer and client
which are strictly for the purposes of pending or contemplated
litigation. French courts seem to be divided, however, on the
issue of whether communications between lawyer and client
which seek or give mere legal advice, with no prospect of being
submitted to pending or contemplated litigation, are also immune from scrutiny. 3
In the context of Community competition law, the concept
of the rights of defence will cover both kinds of communication with one important qualification. Communications exchanged only in order to seek or give mere legal advice and
not for the purpose of pending or contemplated litigation will
be covered by confidentiality if exchanged before the initiation
of the administrative procedure under Regulation 17. 3 ' Further, the communications must have a relationship to the subject-matter of that procedure. This category would seem to include, for example, early advice as to the compatability of an
agreement with the competition rules, the need to notify for a
negative clearance or individual exemption, and the possibility
of fines being imposed by the Commission, among other
things.
31. See Peiris,supranote 9, at 610-1i; R.
1979).

CROSS, CROSS ON EVIDENCE

282 (5th ed.

32. See Peiris, supra note 9, at 610-11; R. CROSS, supra note 31.

33. Compare Judgment of Apr. 28, 1982, Cour d'Appel, Versailles, 1982 J.O.
Nos. 146-47, 11982] 1 GAz. PAL. 310 (correspondence between a lawyer and his client
is strictly confidential no matter how it falls into the hands of a third party) with Judgment of Nov. 18, 1981, Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1982J.O. Nos. 64-65, [1982] 1 GAz. PAL.
127 (correspondence exchanged between a French lawyer and a German lawyer
which is not written in anticipation of litigation but merely gives advice on general
business matters is not covered by privilege).
34. See Regulation 17, supra note 2, I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401.
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3. The Time at Which the Communications Were Exchanged
as a Criterion for Protection
The Court distinguished between two broad categories of
documents that may fall within the scope of protection. The
first category covers written communications between lawyer
and client exchanged after the initiation of the administrative
procedure under Regulation 17.3 The second category covers
written communications exchanged before the initiation of the
procedure, provided that they have a "relationship to the sub' 3
ject-matter of that procedure. 1
The dividing line, therefore, is the initiation of the administrative procedure under Regulation 17 "which may lead to a
decision on the application of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
or to a decision imposing a pecuniary sanction on the undertaking." 3'1 7 Although the time at which the procedure under
Regulation 17 is initiated is not unanimously agreed upon by
legal writers, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Court is
referring to the factual rather than the formal initiation of the
procedure."
35. Id.
36. 1 & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059-60 (Ground 23 of theJudgment).
Fhe definition of the second category of documents may require some further clarification with regard to such terms as "relationship" and "subject-matter of that procedure." See, e.g., C.S. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUs-r PROCEDURE 28-29 (Supp. 1982).
37. A11 & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059-60 (Ground 23 of the Judgment)
(emphasis added). Presumably, when the Court refers to "a decision on the application of Articles 85 and 86," this must also include decisions under article 85(3) and
all the secondary legislation adopted on the basis of those articles.
38. Kuyper & van Rijn, Procedural Guarantees and hVestigatorv , lehods in European
Law, with Special Reereice to Competition, 19821 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 1,15 (1983). The Court
of justice has held in an earlier case, SA Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen, 1973
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, 88, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REt'.
(CCH) 8170, at 8271, that for the purposes of article 9(3) of Regulation 17, tihe
procedure is considered to be initiated by "an authoritative act of the Commission,
evidencing its intention of taking a decision under the said Articles." Id. Virtually
identical language was also used by the Court in the recent IB.11
case where the court
said that "initiation of the procedure Under the above-mentioned provisions is clearly
marked by an act manifesting the intention to take a decision." IBM Corp. v. Comimission, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2639, at 2653, 11979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP,. (CCH) 8708, at 8465 (Ground 15 of thi Judgment). However,
in practice there is often a significant time lapse between the moment the Conimission initiates the procedure under Regulation 17 (for example bw a request for infi)rmation under article 1 1, or by conducting an on-the-spot investigation under article
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In AM & S Europe the communications in question were
almost all connected with legal opinions given towards the end
of 1972 and during the first half of 1973, i.e., they were drawn
up during the period preceding, and immediately following,
the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities. Thus, a period of some seven to eight years elapsed
between the time they were drafted and the initiation by the
Commission of the administrative procedure under Regulation
17.
Despite the fact that so many years had elapsed, these documents were said to be covered by confidentiality. According
to the Court, the documents were principally concerned with
"how far it might be possible to avoid conflict between the applicant (AM & S Europe) and the Community authorities on
the applicant's position, in particular with regard to the Community provisions on competition. ' 39 Thus, the documents
14 of the same Regulation), and the point in time that the Commission takes aformal
decision informing the interested firms and competent authorities in the Member
States that it has initiated the procedure. For the most part, this point in time coincides with notification to the firms of the Statement of Objections. This practice was
approved by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Azienda Colori Nazionali-ACNA
S.p.A. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 933, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8169. On the other hand, a number of authors have
argued that the Decision under article 1I and article 14 of the Regulation constitutes
initiation of the procedure by the Commission, as required by article 9(3) of the Regulation. See Saint-Esteben, La mise en oeuvre de Iarticle 85 aprs larrt de laCour deJustice
des Communauts europienes da 6fevrier 1973, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEN
[R.T.D.E.] 270, 279 (1973); M. WAELBROECK, LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTf
ECONOM1QUE EUROP9ENE 153 (ed. 1972); B. GOLDMAN & A. LYON-CAEN, DROIT COMMERCIAL EUROPIENE 845 (4th ed. 1984); see also IBM, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2639, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708.
In some ways it seems to me artificial to divide up the 'investigative' stage of
the procedure from the so-called 'formal' stage. The whole is one process,
beginning with enquiries, when tentative views are formed on information
given which crystallize into the statement of objections, and which itself
leads to a final decision as to whether or not there has been an infringement.
If that is right, the procedure is initiated in a real sense at a nmch earlier stage
than the decision to serve a statement of objections and flows step by step to
the final decision.
Id. at 2663, 11979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708, at 8471
(per Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn) (emphasis added). The Court of justice
seems to have implicitly corroborated this view in the same case, particularly in
Ground 21 of the Judgment. Id. at 2654, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH)
8708, at 8465-66.
39. AM11 & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1614, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON Mwr. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9049 (Ground 34 of the Judgment).
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fell "within the context of the rights of the defence and the
lawyer's specific duties in that connection. '"40
The ruling of the Court on this particular point is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the Court considers that the
investigations under article 14(1) of Regulation 1741 constitute
initiation of the administrative procedure, at least for the purposes of privilege.4 2 Secondly, the Court gave a rather wide
interpretation to the term "rights of defence" so as to encompass the provision of legal advice in order to help the client to
avoid a future conflict with Community competition rules.4 3
Thirdly, the period of time that may have elapsed between the
provision of the legal advice and the initiation of the procedure
does not seem to matter very much or, at any rate, may be
fairly long, as it was in the case in question.4 4
40. Id.
41. See Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2531 (art.
14(1)).
42. The answer to the question whether the article II and the article 14 decisions constitute initiation of the procedure by the Commission is also significant for
another reason. The criteria and scope of protection of confidentiality vary from one
country to the next. See supra notes 11, 30-33. In addition, the conditions laid down
by the Court for incorporation of the general principle into Community law do not
always coincide with the requirements of all the national laws. On the other hand, it
is accepted that incorporation of a general principle into Community law does not
impose a legal obligation on the Member States to harmonize their domestic law
where it deviates from the position of Community law resulting from such incorporation, i.e. it does not produce a "reverse effect." See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 218 (1981). If it is accepted, therefore, that decisions
under articles II and 14 do constitute the initiation of the procedure within the meaning of article 9(3) of Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2482
(art. 9(3)), then the competent authorities in the Member States are divested of their
authority as regards implementation of articles 85 and 86. Conversely, if it is accepted that they do not constitute the initiation of the procedure, then the same written
communication may, theoretically, be protected by privilege under national law but
not under Community law and vice versa, according to the circumstances of each particular case. This discrepancy will be the result of the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Commission and the Member States as regards implementation of articles 85 and 86
of the EEC Treaty.
43. In this way the meaning of the term "rights of defence" is dissociated from
the requirement that an adversary procedure should be pending before the Commission, although some fairly remote assumption that such a procedure might arise
seems to be required.
44. It is estimated that seven to eight years had elapsed between the giving of
the legal advice and the initiation of the procedure. It could be assumed that undertakings will attach more importance to safeguarding the secrecy of documents that
advise on: I) the status of an agreement or practice under the competition rules;
2) the need to notify; 3) the likelihood of the Commission stumbling upon it; or

14

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

4. Authorship of the Communications as a
Criterion for Protection
The main limitations in the application of the principle of
confidentiality in practice stem from the Court's interpretation
of the authorship of the communication.
a. The Lawyer as Author of the Communication
If a written communication is to be covered by legal privilege, it must, in the opinion of the Court of Justice, "emanate
from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not
bound to the client by a relationship of employment." 45 The
Court's reasons for laying down this condition are set out in
Ground 24 of theJudgment. It states that this requirement "is
based on a conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in
the administration of justice by the courts and as being required to provide, in full independence, and in the overriding
interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client
needs." ' 4 " There are thus two main facets to the lawyer's role

which must coincide when he is giving legal advice to his client.
The lawyer's primary concern must be to contribute to the
proper administration ofjustice. Secondarily, the lawyer must
be concerned with giving completely independent advice. In
cases where a lawyer seeking to justify his client's interests is
faced with a choice between legal advice that is more consonant with his client's wishes and advice that is more in line with
his role in ensuring the proper administration of justice, the
Court's decision is unequivocal: the proper administration of
justice must take precedence. 47
4) the imposition of fines etc., that are exchanged before the initiation of the procedure. There are perhaps two reasons for this. This period may extend many years
into the past, and so the number of documents coming within the scope of the legal
privilege is liable to le much larger. Furthermore, previous correspondence drawn
up without the prospect of being submitted to the Commission is most likely to contain informaion and advice drafted withla a greater mceasunrC of frankness and accuracy. The acquisition of such documents would obviously be extremely revealing and
helpful for the Commission but particularly treacherous for the undertakings.
45. See -1,! & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611. [1979-1981 Transfer
Bindcrl CoMMoN MKr. RFEP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9059 (Ground 21 of the Judigment).
46. 1I.at 1611-12, 11979-1981 Transfer Binderl CoMMON MT. REt. (CCH) 1
8757, at 9060.
47. It can be indirectly inferred from the fact that the Court considered the lawyer's primary role to be his contribution to the proper administration of justice that
the right to protection of confidentiality is lost where the lawyer is party to, or helps
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The counterpart to this dual role lies "in the rules of professional ethics and discipline which are laid down and enforced in the general interest by institutions endowed with requisite powers for that purpose."4 In this way the Court recognizes the rules of professional ethics and discipline as one, or
rather, the only way to put pressure on the lawyer to perform
his role as he should.
i. Status of the Independent Lawyer
The AM & S Europe court made the application of legal
privilege contingent upon the written communication being
drafted by an independent lawyer. It remains to be determined, however, which of the two aspects of the lawyer's
role,4 9 as expressed by the Court, will be fulfilled by the requirement in the AM & S Europe judgment that the lawyer be
independent.
There is no doubt that it is the lawyer's duty to give independent legal advice that more closely satisfies the independence requirement of AM & S Europe. The Court thus appears
to hold that the advice given is more likely to be independent
where the lawyer is not tied to his client by a relationship of
employment. 5" By contrast, one could have justifiably concluded from the above that, since the primary role of the lawyer,
as the Court acknowledged, is to contribute to the proper administration of justice rather than seek to safeguard the interests of his client, the legal advice would-in theory at leastalways be independent, irrespective of whether or not lawyer
and client were bound to each other by a relationship of employment.
The Court's reluctance to place independent lawyers and
in-house lawyers on the same footing is understandable to
some degree. The fact that the in-house lawyer has only one
his client commit, an illegal act. The Court makes no specific mention, however, of
cases or conditions in which the right to protection is actually lost. Apparently, this
was not at issue in the case in question.
. 48. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1612, [1979-1981
Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9060.
49. See supra notes 45 and 47 and accompanying text.
50. It is quite difficult to accept that the existence of a relationship of employment between lawyer and client can induce the lawyer to systematically transgress his
primary role which, as we have seen, is to contribute to the proper administration of
justice.
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client, his employer, is thought in some Member States of the
Community to put him in a different, more difficult and less
independent position than that of the non-corporate lawyer.
Not only must he be sensitive to the interests and activities of
his employer, but he must also take due account of the opinions and attitudes of his superiors who happen, in many cases,
not to be lawyers. On the other hand, permanent involvement
with the activities of one firm and direct dependence on this
firm for their salary is thought to lead in-house lawyers to identify themselves with the firm's interests to the detriment of
their independence, and the discipline and influence that professional and other union organisations might be able to exercise.
The opposite may, however, be argued with equal merit.
In-house lawyers may, in fact, feel safer and more confident
leaving one corporation and seeking employment with another
if-they disagree with the management. This phenomena may
be more likely if the lawyer is a specialist in a particular area.
Furthermore, in-house lawyers can always get the advice of an
outside lawyer in cases where they think they may disagree
with the board of directors. By contrast, a lawyer or a small,
independent firm of lawyers may sometimes be willing to do
anything for a major client, particularly when it is struggling
for survival."
In short, it seems difficult to draw a line between the two
and generalize afterwards. It should also be remembered that
attitudes, behavior and personalities differ.
As a criterion for determining the lawyer's degree of independence the Court thus preferred the legal (absence of a relationship of employment) to the actual (professional conscience)
relationship between lawyer and client. In seeking to substantiate its preference the Court resorts to the rules of professional ethics and discipline which it considers to constitute the
counterpart of confidentiality. However, this plainly highlights
the contradictions in its reasoning. The two Advocates-Gen51. For all the above reasons, full-time employment in some Member States is
incompatible with the professional status of lawyers and, consequently, on entering
their employment they are disbarred (e.g., in Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg). In other Member States the employed lawyer remains subject to the rules of
professional ethics and discipline. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
1655, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9085.
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eral (and almost everyone who has voiced an opinion on the
judgment) were unanimous in their view that legal privilege
should also extend to in-house lawyers where they continue to
be members of the appropriate lawyers' societies or bars and
are subject to the rules of professional ethics and discipline.
Thus, while the Court advances the same grounds (rules of
professional ethics and discipline) in support of its argument,
it unjustifiably excludes all in-house lawyers from the protection of confidentiality of communications.5 3 The result of this
approach is rather obscure. In seeking to avoid differentiation
in treatment of in-house lawyers from one state to the next, the
Court was content to see thefonn (i.e. uniform application of
Community protection of confidentiality) take precedence over
the substance (i.e. protection of confidentiality of in-house lawyers in the Member States where they continue to be members
of the appropriate lawyers' societies or bars and are subject to
the rules of professional ethics and discipline). However, were
the Court to adopt this latter approach, the differentiation in
treatment would be the consequence of the disparate national
laws and not a result of the Community principle of confidentiality.
In an attempt to appraise the competing interests involved, it is submitted that from the standpoint of policy considerations the Court's judgment on this point exhibits considerable merits. At the time legal privilege was developed in
common law jurisdictions, professional legal advisers were in
independent practice and the clients were small merchants or
individual citizens. In modern society, however, the emer52. See, e.g., id. at 1655, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9085 (Opinion of Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn); id. at 1640, [19791981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9076 (Opinion of Advocate-General J.P. Warner).
53. Exclusion of in-house lawyers from protection of confidentiality has been

the subject of sharp criticism in virtually all the legal literature. See C.S. KERSE, supra
note 36, at 29; Forrester, Legal ProfessionalPrivilege: Limitations on the Commission "sPowners of Inspection Following the AM & S Judgment, 20 COMM. MET. L. REV. 75, 82 (1983);
Ghandi, Legal ProfessionalPrivilege in European Community Law, 7 EUR. L. REV. 308, 313
(1982); Goffin, Le Principe de la Confidentialiti, 18 CAHXERS DE DROIT EUROPEN 381,
398-99 (1982); Lasok, AM & S - The Court Decides, 3 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 99,

102-03 (1982); Pagone, Legal ProfessionalPrivilege in the European Communities: the A.11 &
S Case and Australian Law, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 663, 680 (1984); Usher, Legal Professional Privilege and Confidentiality in EEC Competition Proceedings: The Judgment of the European Court, 1982J. Bus. L. 398, 400. But see Kuyper & van Rijn, supra note 38, at 15.

18

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

gence of large corporate entities with in-house legal departments may give rise to a greater risk of abuse. This may occur,
for example, if corporations are permitted to hide otherwise
discoverable information by using their legal department as a
conduit through which all potentially incriminating documents
are transmitted. Since corporations cannot be denied the right
to legal privilege, it is not surprising that common law courts
have developed several different standards to control the application of privilege to corporate communications."
By contrast, in civil law jurisdictions where legal and institutional tradition is different, 5 the risks of abuse of the privilege in corporate communications does not seem to be higher
than when individual clients are involved. Independent lawyers, upon entering full-time in-house employment, are, as a
rule, disbarred."' As a result, they cannot defend their employers in court or claim protection on the grounds of professional secrecy. Consequently, documents exchanged between
a corporation and its in-house lawyer are subject to the same
rules of search and seizure as the documents of individual clients.
Seen against this background, the Commission's limited
resources and powers of search would run the risk of becoming
virtually ineffective if the right to confidentiality were to be
granted unconditionally to business concerns.5 7 Obviously
aware of these risks of abuse, the Court understandably looked
for appropriate means to counterbalance the negative effects
of affording the right to privilege to undertakings. It opted for
54. Such standards include the control group test, the subject matter test, the
modified subject matter test and under United States law, the Ampicillin test. See In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1978); see, e.g., Gergacz,
Attorney-Client Pivilege, 37 Bus. LAw. 461 (1982); Note, The Attorney,-Client Privilege and
the Cowporate Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 665 (1983).
55. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
56. Supra note 51. This is implicit from the laws of certain Member States in
Continental Europe, e.g. in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Italy, and apparently in Germany and the Netherlands. Only lawyers who actually practice their profession have the right to be registered. Upon entering full time employment, i.e., inhouse counsel, lawyers must notify the Bar at which point they are disbarred. See AM
& S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1655, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757 (Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn).
57. The Commission does not dispose of wide powers of search and seizure and
cannot seal documents. It may only ask for the submission of information. See Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 2531 (art. 14).
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the solution offered by the continental legal systems. In other
words, it excluded from protection of confidentiality all lawyers who are in full-time employment (in-house lawyers) even
if they continue in some Member States to be subject to the
same rules of professional ethics and discipline as their independent counterparts.
ii. Status of the In-House Lawyer
The Court considers an independent lawyer to be one
who is "not bound to the client by a relationship of employment."' 58 In contrast, an in-house lawyer will be bound to his
client by a relationship of employment. At first sight this wording seems to be so general that it would cover cases involving a
permanent contract of employment to provide legal services and

cases where the relationship is less close, either as regards the
period involved or its legal nature.
The definition undoubtedly includes lawyers who provide
legal or other services in their capacity as employees of a company (in-house lawyers). Thus, any written communication
passing between a company and its in-house counsel will not be
immune from scrutiny because it did not emanate from an independent lawyer. 9
In an attempt to circumvent the Court's ruling on this
point, undertakings may be prompted to try to convert their
legal departments into separate legal offices with the appearance of independence. 60 Further, in-house lawyers may be
tempted to give oral rather than written advice. It is known
that in many cases the facts and legal aspects of the problems
are so complex and the interpretation of the rules of competi58. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
8757, at 9055.

59. In most Member States the profession of lawyer is exercised not only on an
individual basis but also by groups of lawyers in the form of a firm. This being so, it
must be accepted that a written communication exchanged between a company and a
lawyer belonging to such a firm is covered by privilege since the lawyer is an em-

ployee of the firm of lawyers and not of the company in question.
60. See Duffy, Legal Privilege and Community Law, 132 NEw LJ. 580, 582 (1982);
Pagone, supra note 53, at 680. Apart from the legal and practical difficulties which
such a conversion is likely to encounter in the legal systems of the Member States, it
is submitted here that it would most probably not comply with the Court's Judgment
either, particularly with the requirement that the lawyer should be independent.
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tion so difficult that recourse to oral advice cannot effectively
satisfy a corporation's interests.
If a corporation feels that oral advice on a particular problem is not sufficient, its only recourse would appear to be to
seek legal advice from an outside, independent lawyer. Inhouse lawyers would then appear to enjoy a somewhat wider
degree of protection. Indeed, the in-house lawyer employed
by corporation X may provide written legal advice to corporation Y, to which he is not linked by an employment relationship, provided, of course, that the terms of the employment
relationship that binds him to corporation X permit him to do
so. 6 1 In this case, written communications passing between the
lawyer and corporation Y would be covered by legal privilege
even though the lawyer is an employee of corporation X. This
view is not at first sight discernible from the Court's judgment.
It does not, however, clash with the letter of the judgment.
The Court considers as independent lawyers those who are not
bound to the client by a relationship of employment. It is submitted that this must be true particularly in cases where the inhouse lawyer continues to be a member of a lawyers' society or
bar and is subject to its rules of professional ethics and discipline.
In AM & S Europe the Court did not impart a Community
content to the term "relationship of employment," i.e. the answer to the question as to when a lawyer is bound to his client
by a relationship of employment will be decided on the basis of
the domestic law of the Member State in question. This means
that the rules of private international law of the State in which
the client has his residence, or where the lawyer provides his
services, will be applied in determining the rule of law to be
applied.
Closely related to this problem is the question whether an
in-house lawyer of a subsidiary belonging to a multinational
group with one or more subsidiaries inside or outside the
Community should be deemed, for the purposes of privilege,
to be bound by a relationship of employment to all members of
61. This occurs particularly in West Germany, and in the case of solicitors, in

England. See I THE

ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, CMD.

7648, No. 20, at

234-35, 240-41 (1979). Naturally, companies X and Y should not be direct competitors in the market. Otherwise the conduct of the in-house lawyer may be considered
to be contrary to the rules of professional ethics and discipline.
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the multinational group. In accordance with the Court's caselaw, the criterion in this case is the degree of economic independence enjoyed by the subsidiary in determining its course
of action on the market. 62
In AM & S Europe, Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn
suggested, by contrast, that documents drawn up by or for one
member of the group and subsequently found in the possession of another should be protected by confidentiality. This is
justified by the common interest of all members of the group.
The Court seems to have endorsed the principle of group interest by holding that a certain document found at the premises of AM & S during the investigation by Commission officials was protected by confidentiality. The document contained advice from an independent English solicitor which was
initially given to AM & S's parent company in Australia and not
to AM & S. Thus, the answer to this question will hinge on the
response to the previous question as to the degree of economic independence of a subsidiary vis-a-vis its parent company.
It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that in-house lawyers
of a subsidiary which does not possess a sufficient degree of
independence vis-?-vis its parent company may be considered
to be bound by a relationship of employment to all members of
the group. As a result, the correspondence between them will
not benefit from the principle of confidentiality. It can be concluded that in such cases a lawyer is required to pass a double
scrutiny: first, with regard to his national law, it must be determined whether he is bound to his client by a relationship of
employment; and second, with regard to Community law, it
must be seen whether he is an employed lawyer of all members
of the multinational group for the purposes of the Community
principle of confidentiality.
iii. Status of the Legal Adviser
The status of a legal advisor is uncertain. For example,
what happens in the case of a lawyer who, although not a fulltime employee of a company, renders purely legal services for
a fixed annual or monthly fee? Can lawyers falling within this
62. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at 8001.
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category be considered to be bound to the companies they advise by a relationship of employment no matter how tenuous
this relationship may be?
The institution of independent lawyers rendering legal
services to corporations for a fixed annual or monthly fee exists in virtually all Member States of the EEC. In French law,
for instance, the position of lawyers providing purely legal
services and receiving a fixed annual or monthly fee is described, in the prevailing view, as a contract for the provision
of services or hired labour."3 Such a lawyer is never considered to be an employee, or in-house lawyer, although objectively at least, he is bound to the firm by a relationship of employment. Moreover, in England a lawyer or firm of lawyers
may be bound to one or more companies by a special contractual relationship for the provision of services, which is known
as a contract of retainer. The same contractual relationship in
France is known as contrat d'abonnement.

It is submitted here that the principle affording legal privilege to written communications passing between lawyers and
their clients should also be afforded to the above category of
lawyers for two main reasons. Firstly, such lawyers remain, for
the duration of this contractual relationship, independent of
the companies to whom they supply their services. Secondly,
they retain membership of their lawyers' societies or bars and
are thus still subject to the rules of professional ethics and discipline in all Member States.
It would appear that the Court has underestimated the
problems that a broad interpretation of the concept relationship of employment is liable to entail. For this reason alone a
narrow interpretation of the notion embracing in-house lawyers exclusively would seem to be in keeping with the spirit of
the Court's decision without, on the other hand, disregarding
the situation existing in the laws of all Member States."4 Admittedly all these uncertainties would have been easily avoided
had the Court used instead the term "contract of full-time employment" or "a lawyer in a permanent contractual relationship."-5
63. See I H. SOLUS & R. PERROT, DROITJUDICIAIRE PRivE 789 (1961).
64. See Gandhi, supra note 53, at 314.
65. It should be stressed that the Court itself was well aware of the distinction
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b. The Requirement That a Lawyer Should be Registered
with a Bar or Have the Right to Practise His
Profession in a Member State
In Ground 25 of the Judgment the Court imposed a further condition for the protection of confidentiality. The lawyer
must not be bound to his client by a relationship of employment and at the same time he must be entitled to practise his
profession in one of the Member States.
It is interesting to note that the French version of the
Judgment uses the term "lawyers enrolled in a bar in one of
the Member States" rather than "lawyer entitled to practise his
profession in one of the Member States," as the English text
reads."" The Court seems to have drawn its terminology from
article 17 of' the Court's statute,"7 in which the same discrepancy between the French and English texts gives rise to comment. This discrepancy also has practical significance since the
English version seems to be broader in meaning than the
French."' Indeed, the former appears to cover both barristers
between the three categories of lawyers described in the text. Indeed, during the
second oral hearing, the Court invited the litigants to submit their views on the national laws of tie Member States relating to the protection of legal privilege in the
communications exchanged between a client and: (i) an independent lawyer; (ii) a
lawyer in a permanent contractual relationship or one who is an employee of an undertaking; and (iii) a legal adviser. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
1604, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. Rip. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9056. One
is therefore left wondering why the Court preferred the vague term "relationship of
employment' and did not use one of the more precise terms indicated above.
66. Id. at 1612, 11979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757,
at 9058. Although formally the two texts have the same force, the English version
must be considered more correct as English was the language of the proceedings.
67. Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Comnmnities, Apr. 17, 1957. 1973 GR. BRIT. T.S. No. I (Cmd 5179-Il) 245, 249 (official English version), 298 U.N.T.S. 147 (unofficial English version).
68. Id. The English text states: "Other parties must be represented b a lawyer
entitled to practice before a court of a Member State." 1973 GR. BRIT. T.S. No. I
(Cmd 5179-I1) at 249 (official English version). [he corresponding French text
reads: "Les autres parties doivent tre repic sentes par Un avocat inscrit a un barrcar de l'un des Etats meibres." 294 U.N.T.S. 227, 233 (tnolrocial French version).
It appears firom these texts that the criterion of eligibility for appearance before the
Court of Justice is not the nationably of a Member State but either enrollment in a Bar
of a Member State (French version) or entitlement to practise the profession of lawver in a Member State (English version). As a result, lawyers from non-Communitv
countries who satisfy one of the aforementioned conditions should normally be permitted to appear before the Court. For this reason it is felt that the Court's indirect
references to article 17 of its Statute do not clarify the issues.
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and solicitors, while the French text would seem to cover only
lawyers entitled to represent their clients in Court (right of audience), i.e., barristers. The English version of the term is considered to be more correct. English was the official language
of the case and some of the documents held to be covered by
legal privilege in AM 69& S Europe were drafted by an independent English solicitor.
As a result of this condition, legal advice given by certain other persons, such as patent agents or
tax advisers, would obviously not be protected even though
they do enjoy protection in certain Member States.7"
The case of conseils juridiques in France seems to pose a
number of problems. Although they are officially allowed to
provide legal advice, they may appear only before lower courts
in a few minor instances. On the other hand, they may not be
registered with a bar or law society. They are organized in a
separate legal profession and may only be employed by, or associated with, other conseils juridiques.
A preliminary approach to the problem would seem to
suggest that the conseilsjuridiques are eligible for protection by
the principle of confidentiality (assuming that the other conditions laid down by the Court are met). The Court's reference
to the Council Directive 7 ' on the freedom to provide legal
services, however, leaves no room for doubt that they are excluded from protection.7" They do not fall within the category
of lawyers to which the Council Directive applies.7 3 It is highly
questionable whether the profession of conseiljuridique, in the
manner it is organized and the legal services it provides, could
be considered to collaborate effectively "in the administration
69. A,1

& S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer

Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757.
70. In connection with patent agents in the U.K., see Civil Evidence Act, 1968,
ch. 64, § 15.
71. Council Directive, supra note 5.
72. See.11 & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 8757, at 9060.
73. See Council Directive, supra note 5 (art. 1(2)). The Council Directive provides:
2. 'Lawyer' means any person entitled to pursue his professional activities under one of the following designations:
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of justice by the courts." 7 4
The most important consequence of the condition that a
lawyer must be enrolled in a bar or law society in one of the
Member States is that communications written by lawyers from
third countries, i.e. non-Member State countries, are excluded
from protection of confidentiality. In most Member States, nationality of the state in which the lawyer intends to practise his
profession is a prerequisite for membership in a bar.75 As a
result, any written communication between a Member State
firm and, for. example, an American lawyer will not be protected by legal privilege irrespective of the law-be it Community or American-that the advice given seeks to interpret.
A literal interpretation of Ground 25 of the Judgment,
however, may lead to another result. An independent lawyer
from a third country who is lawfully registered with a bar or
entitled to practise his profession on the same footing as an
EEC lawyer in a Member State will fall within the protection of
the principle of confidentiality.7 6
Belgium:
Denmark:
Germany:

Avocat-Advocast
Advokat
Rechtsanwalt

[Greece:

ALK'qyopoq]

France:
Ireland:

Avocat
Barrister
Solicitor
Avvocato
Avocat-avoue
Advocaat
Advocate
Barrister
Solicitor

Italv:
Luxembourg:
Netherlands:
United Kingdom:

Id.
74. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1611-12, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)

ment); Goffin, supra note 53, at 400-01.
75. See S.P. LAGUETrE, L'AVOCAT

DANS

8757, at 9060 (Ground 24 of theJudgLES

9

ETATS

DE

LA

COMMUNAUTI

EUROPkENE (1978).

76. Ground 25 of the Judgment reads: "the protection . . . must apply without
distinction to any lawyer entitled to practise his profession in one of the Member States
....
" AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9060 (Ground 25 of the Judgment)
(emphasis added); see also Kreis, The AM & Sjudgment of the European Court ofJstice and
its Consequences Within and Outside the Conimunity, 20 Swiss REV. INT'L ANTITRUST L. 3,
20 (1984).
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c. Protection of Confidentiality and the Council Directive on
Freedom to Provide Legal Services
The Court's requirement that a lawyer should be entitled
to practise his profession in a Member State was further elucidated by a requirement set out in a Council Directive." The
Court stated that:
protection [of confidentiality] may not be extended beyond
those limits, which are determined by the scope of the common rules on the exercise of the legal profession ....

[This direc-

tive] is based in turn on the mutual recognition by all the
Member States of the national legal concepts of each of
them on this subject.7 8
The Court's reference to the freedom of establishment
and the freedom to provide legal services has not received adequate attention from those who have passed an opinion on the
Judgment. This is particularly true with regard to the aforementioned Council Directive." ' If construed literally, this passage from the Court's Judgment undoubtedly provides much
room for interpretation of its far reaching implications in
terms of their precise scope and purpose."'
One possible interpretation would suggest that the Court
wished not only to explain further the category of lawyers who
are entitled to practise their profession in all Member States.
It may also be read to suggest that the protection of confidentiality should be confined exclusively to the list of lawyers mentioned in the provisions of that Council Directive.8 ' On the
other hand, it is equally possible that the Court, having previously considered the rules of professional ethics and discipline
as the counterpart to protection, also wanted to substantiate its
argument by making a further reference to the parallel provi77. Council Directive, supra note 5.
78. IAM& S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1612, 11979-1981 I'ransfer
Binder I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8757, at 9060 (Ground 26 of' the Judgment)
(emphasis added): see also Council Directive, supra note 5 (art. 6).
79. See Council Directive, supra note 5.
80. One could hardly suggest that the Judgment was the result of' an oversight
aler proceedings lasting two and a half years. Apart from the parties concerned, iwo
governments and the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the
Eluropean Communities intervened. There were two oral hearings and the opinions
of two Advocates-General were given.
81. See Council Directive, supra note 5; see also C.S. KERSE, sopna note 36, at 54;
Goffin, supra note 53, at 399.

1985-86]

LEGAL PRIVILEGE IN EEC

sions of the Council Directive. 2
As a result, any remaining doubts concerning the extent of
the protection arising from the different standards of the rules
on professional ethics and discipline applicable in the Member
States would be dismissed. The principle of confidentiality
would be considered to be applicable "without distinction to
any lawyer entitled to practise his profession in one of the
member States regardless of the Member State in which the

client lives."8 "
It is also quite plausible that the Court simply wished to
point out that the question of professional secrecy had already
been mentioned in the Council Directive. Hence, the Court
had one further reason to base the protection of confidentiality
in EEC competition law only on the principles that were found
to be common in the laws of all the Member States. 4
i.The Council Directive
It is submitted here that by invoking the provisions of the
Council Directive, the Court wanted to impose certain limits
on the extent to which confidentiality ought to be applied in
practice. It is thus necessary to elaborate on the first of the
above possible interpretations and attempt to touch on some
of its implications.
The purpose of the Council Directive is merely to facilitate
the freedom of lawyers to provide legal services within the
Common Market.8 5 Article 1(2) specifies exhaustively the categories of lawyers in all Member States who may invoke the provisions of the Council Directive. However, in dealing with the
problem arising here, particular account must be taken of the
legal basis of the Council Directive. According to the first paragraph of its preamble, "any limitation of the provision of
services based on nationality or residence requirements shall
be abolished at the end of the transitional period." 6 The
82. See Council Directive, supra note 5 (art. 4).
83. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9060 (Ground 25 of the Judgment).
84. See Council Directive, supra note 5 (art. 4).
85. See de Brauw, La Liberalisationde laprofession d'avocat en Europe apris la directive
imise par le Conseil des Ministres des Commaunautis Europeennes, 14 CAHIERS DE DROIT

33 (1978).
86. Council Directive, supra note 5 (preamble).
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Council Directive's legal basis is thus article 57 and 66 of the
EEC Treaty. In other words, the Directive applies only to lawyers who are nationals of one of the Member States of the
Community. Consequently, while the criterion for the third
condition imposed by the Court is membership of a bar or the
right to practise the profession in a Member State, the Court's
reference to the Council Directive would seem to add a further
criterion: the lawyer must be a national of a Member State of
the Community.
A literal interpretation of the Court's reference to freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services and to
the Council Directive consequently points to the following
conclusion. The confidentiality of a communication between
lawyer and client will be protected only where the lawyer, aside
from fulfilling the conditions laid down by the Court, also has
the nationality of a Member State of the Community and both
lawyer and client reside within the Community but not necessarily in the same Member State.
In West Germany, German nationality is not a prerequisite of membership of a bar.87 In Belgium, a foreign national
may become a member of a Belgian bar if there is a bilateral
agreement between Belgium and the national's state, i.e., if
reciprocity exists. 8 Finally, in France, although French nationality is, in principle, a prerequisite of membership of a bar,
certain bilateral agreements with former French colonies extend the right to exercise the profession of lawyer, on the basis
of reciprocity, to nationals of those countries. 8 9
Thus the Court's reference to the Council Directive might
have another important implication. It may also exclude certain categories of lawyers from the protection of confidentiality. For example, non-Member State lawyers who are entitled
to practise their profession in one of the Member States and
are registered with a bar or lawyers' society in that State may
87. See S.P. LAGUE-rrE, supra note 75, at 32. It should be pointed out that,
although any discrimination on nationality grounds has been abolished for nationals
of the Member States, such discrimination may lawfully exist where nationals of nonMember States are concerned.
88. Id. at 31-32.
89. As, for example, with Dahomey, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Ivory
Coast, Angola, the Central African Republic and Gabon. See S.P. LAGUETrE, supra
note

75,

at

30;J.

LEMAIRE, LES RIGLES DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT ET LES USAGES DU

BARREAU DE PARIS

430 (1975).
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be excluded.!" ° However, this would be in contradiction, at
least, to the laws of the U.K., Ireland, France, and possibly the
Netherlands. In these states foreign lawyers enjoy the same
degree of protection of confidentiality as national lawyers,
without additional requirements."'
ii. Right of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide
Legal Services
It is necessary at this juncture to distinguish between the
right of establishment of the lawyer and the freedom to provide legal services. In the latter case a distinction must be
made between provision of legal services where lawyer and client reside in the same Member State and where the lawyer resides in a State different from that in which the client he is advising resides.
Assume that an EEC lawyer is legally registered with a bar,
or entitled to practise his profession in one Member State. He
is thus bound by the rules of professional ethics and discipline
of that State. He may exercise his profession in another Member State on a permanent basis, without also becoming registered with a bar in that State. This may be the case if he has
not acquired the necessary qualifications. Such cases may very
well arise in those Member States where legal consultation is
not the exclusive preserve of lawyers registered with a bar in
those States. The Court ofJustice recently affirmed in Ordre des
Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. 0. Klopp 92 that it is very likely that a
Member State lawyer may simultaneously practise in two or
more Member States. For example, a lawyer may open a secondary establishment in another Member State to advise with
respect to his national law, international law, or Community
90. E.g., Germany, Belgium, or France.
91. See S.L. PHIPSON, PHIPSON'S MANUAL ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 251 (Buzzard, Almot, Mitchel rev. 1970); Judgment of Mar., 1982, Cour d'Appel, Paris, [ 1982]
GAZ. PAL. 5. It would appear from the legal systems of the remaining Member States
that a non-Member State lawyer does not enjoy protection of confidentiality because
he cannot be registered with a bar. This result would have been the same for EEC
lawyers had the Council Directive not been in force. See Council Directive, supra note
5.
92. Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. 0. Klopp, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,639, at 11,529-30 (preliminary ruling by the Court ofJustice, Judgment
of 12 July 1984).
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law. He may simultaneously maintain an establishment in his
country of origin providing more complete legal services.
In AM & S Europe, the Court of Justice's reference to the
Council Directive can be interpreted as imposing a separate
and positive condition for the application of the principle of
confidentiality. However, this interpretation inevitably leads
to quite unacceptable conclusions. For example, the lawyer
and client communications mentioned in the above example
may be excluded from the protection of confidentiality. Such
lawyers will be thought of as providing their legal services
outside the scope of the right of establishment and the limits of
the Council Directive.9 3
As a second hypothetical, assume that the client of a member state lawyer, whether or not a national of a Member State,
is residing or established outside the territorial boundaries of
the Community. A literal interpretation of the Court's Judgment will also unjustifiably exclude from the protection of confidentiality communications passing between the Member
State lawyer and his client. His services will be considered not
to fall within the scope of the Council Directive.
A third hypothetical more amply demonstrates how difficult it is to understand the reasoning underlying the Court's
reference to the Council Directive. Let us again assume that a
lawyer from a third country, for instance, an independent lawyer from the United States, is legally registered with a bar in
Belgium. The lawyer provides his services to clients (whether
or not a national of a Member State): (a) residing in Belgium,
(b) residing in other Member States, and (c) residing in third
countries. This lawyer is legally registered with the Belgian
bar, but as an American, he is not able to invoke the right of
establishment enshrined in the EEC Treaty on the basis of the
domestic law of that country.
The application of Grounds 25 and 26 of theJudgment to
the above hypotheticals naturally leads to the conclusion that
this lawyer's communications would not be covered by the
principle of confidentiality. By contrast, assuming that all the
other conditions laid down by the Court for the protection of
confidentiality are met, one could justifiably have expected that
93. See supra note 73. Similar doubts were expressed by Usher, supra note 53, at
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the lawyer's communication with his client in hypothetical (a)
to be covered by confidentiality. The communication in hypothetical (b) might not be covered, as the provisions of the
Council Directive could not be invoked. In hypothetical (c),
however, the communication should be covered by privilege
when the actions of those firms produce effects within the
Common Market.
In the light of what was said earlier, if one examines once
again the condition that a lawyer must be a member of a bar
together with the Court's reference to the Council Directive it
is reasonable to conclude that the Court's aim seems to have
been twofold. First, the court tried to show that the principle
of legal privilege applies to all categories of independent lawyers mentioned in the Council Directive, even where lawyer
and client do not reside in the same Member State. This was
accomplished by specifying the geographic area in which freedom to provide legal services and the protection thereof exists.
Second, the Court stressed its lack ofjurisdiction in judging the
validity of the guarantee provided by the rules of professional
ethics and discipline of non-member countries compared with
the corresponding rules of the Member States, as well as its
reluctance to try to exercise such jurisdiction. 4 The Court's
twofold aim could have been achieved just as effectively, however, by means of a sole requirement mandating that a lawyer
either be a member of a bar or be entitled to practice his profession in a Member State. The reference to the Council Directive would therefore appear to be inexplicable and unwarranted.
For all of these reasons, and particularly because the lack
of protection in the case of a non-Member State lawyer entitled
to practice his profession or register with a bar in a Member
State, a different reading of Ground 26 of theJudgment is proposed here. The reference to the Council Directive should
function not as a separate and positive condition for the recognition of the protection of confidentiality, but only as a negative
requirement remaining always subordinate to the main condition
94. It is questioned, however, whether the Court, by refusing to recognize that
the rules of professional ethics and discipline of third countries provide the same
degree of guarantee, has implicitly acknowledged what it had tried to avoid, namely
its fear that the rules of professional ethics and discipline of third countries may be
inferior to those of the Member States of the Community.
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that the lawyer be registered with a bar or entitled to practice
his profession in one of the Member States.
Under this reading, the scope and purpose of Ground 26
of the Judgment would be confined exclusively to determining
the category of lawyers who are entitled to practise their profession in the Member States. This category will include only
the designations of lawyers mentioned in article 1(2) of the
Council Directive. If so, legal professions such as the conseil
juridique in France 9 5 or avoue (except the avocat avoue in Luxembourg) and any other designations not included in the Council
Directive, will not fall within the category of lawyers entitled to
benefit from the principle of confidentiality.
For the sake of clarity it must be emphasized that lawyers
from non-Member States who are legally registered with a bar
in one of the Member States should be subsumed under the
Community principle of confidentiality. On the contrary, there
is a group of lawyers who do not benefit from the protection of
confidentiality. This group consists of independent lawyers
from non-Member States who are established in one Member
State on the basis of bilateral treaties between their countries
and the Member State concerned. These lawyers may provide
consulting services on their respective national laws, international law or even Community law, but may not be registered
with a bar or entitled to practice their profession to the full
extent (i.e. do not enjoy the right of audience) in the Member
State in which they are established. 96 The principles of comity
and equity in international relations would appear to require
that independent lawyers from non-Member States be treated
in the same manner as lawyers who are nationals of the Member States when they fulfill the other conditions imposed by
the Court.
The Commission was apparently influenced by those considerations. It subsequently announced that on grounds of equity in international relations and in consideration of the interests of independent lawyers in the Member States, the Commission would submit appropriate proposals to the Council to
95. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
96. It is questioned whether the communications of such lawyers are covered by
confidentiality when they are employed by EEC law firms and their advice cannot be
individualized.
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negotiate agreements based on reciprocity with certain nonMember States with a view toward extending legal privilege to
their independent lawyers. 97
In view of the relatively small number of officials working
for the Commission's competition department,9 8 and the present stage of development of Community competition law, it
would be fair to say that the Commission is still to a large extent obliged to rely on voluntary compliance by businesses
with the rules of the EEC Treaty for the effective implementation of Community competition law. 99 This presupposes, however, that companies are free to avail themselves of appropriate legal advice of their own choosing, even if such counsel is
afforded by a lawyer from a non-Member State.' 00
Companies that have a large turnover and whose business
activities extend beyond the territorial limits of the Community
are potential transgressors of the competition rules embodied
in the EEC Treaty. An example of this is the hypothetical case
of a merger or joint venture in the Common Market, or an
agreement to grant a license for an industrial property right,
involving a Community company and a company with its registered office in the United States. In this hypothetical, legal advice given by a lawyer from one of the Member States will also
be protected by privilege in the United States, whereas advice
97. See Confidentiality of legal documents: application of the competition rules, 16 BULL.
EUR. COMMUNITIES,

Aug. 1983, at 43 [hereinafter cited as "Confidentiality of Legal

Documents"]; see also Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizingthe Commission to
open negotiations with a view to the conclusion of agreements between the European Economic
Community and certain third countries concerning the protection of legal papers in connection with
the application of the rules on competition, DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EURO-

COM(84) 548 final (9 Oct. 1984) [hereinafter cited as "COM(84)
548 final"] (internal document submitted to the Council of Ministers of the European
Economic Community by the Commission and not published, but available to the
public).
98. The Commission's competition department is also known as DGIV.
99. Community law, unlike American competition law, does not provide for
class actions or treble damages. Moreover, infringements of Community competition law are not criminal offenses. Although damage actions seem to exist in theory,
they have hitherto not been widely applied. See C.S. KERSE, supra note 36, at 266-77
(references therein to judgments of national courts); see also Garden Cottage Foods,
Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board, [1983] 3 W.L.R. 143 (recent judgment of the House of
PEAN COMMUNITIES,

Lords); Picafiol, Remedies in National Law for Breach of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty: A Review, [1983] 2 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION I.
100. See, e.g., Temple Lang, Compliance with the Common
iiarket's Antitrust Law, 14
INT'L LAW.

485, 502-03 (1980).
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emanating from an American lawyer will not, even where it
concerns interpretation of American law. The result is that
non-Community businesses are obliged to go beyond the objective limits of prudent business activity to the extent that they
are required to avail themselves of lawyers from one of the
Member States if they wish their communications to benefit
from legal privilege. In contrast, the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and his client is protected by the
national laws of some Member States even if the lawyer is a
foreign national. What should the solution be, however, where
communications exchanged between lawyer and client were
drafted by both a lawyer (whether an independent or in-house
lawyer) from a non-Member State and an independent Member State lawyer, resulting in constituent parts that cannot be
separated? Should the involvement of the Member State lawyer, who fulfills the other conditions laid down by the Court of
Justice, be sufficient to provide the necessary sanction for the
principle of confidentiality to apply?
Finally, the Court was unable to avoid a further contradiction in its reasoning. Some of the documents considered protected by legal privilege had been drafted some seven or eight
years before the Commission initiated the procedure."' According to the Court's Judgment, those documents should not
have been considered protected by legal privilege since the
United Kingdom was not yet a Member State when the documents were drafted. 0 2 Therefore, the lawyers who drafted the
documents were nationals of a non-Member State.'0 ° For
some unknown reason, however, the Court considered them
101. I.e., exactly one year before the United Kingdom became a member of the
European Community.
102. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757.
103. It would perhaps be going too far to infer from the Court's judgment on
this point that the crucial moment at which all the conditions it laid down for the
application of protection of confidentiality are fulfilled is the moment when the Commission begins its investigation at the company's premises, and not the time at which
the documents were drafted. Indeed, there is no doubt that a communication to the
lawyer, or by the lawyer, to his client, will be deprived of the protection of confidentiality if it was made before their relationship was entered into or after it ended. This
is necessary because the lawyer, when providing his legal service, must act in his
capacity as a lawyer. On the other hand, once all the conditions are met and privilege
is attached to the communications they will remain privileged unless the right is
waived or lost.
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protected by the principle of confidentiality.

0 4

d. The Client as Author of the Communications
Written communications that "emanate from independent
lawyers" are protected by legal privilege. 0 5 The Court's repeated use of the term emanatefrom creates the impression that
only written communications sent by the lawyer are immune
from scrutiny. But are documents sent by the client to his lawyer requesting legal advice also protected? In some sections of
its judgment the Court uses the term "protection of written
communications exchanged between a lawyer and his client".' 6
But any exchange necessarily presupposes two interested parties: the client who normally first sends a letter to his lawyer
stating the facts and requesting legal assistance, and the lawyer
who then sends a letter in reply. Furthermore, according to
the Court, the purpose of confidentiality is to enable "any person ... without constraint, to consult a lawyer.
,,0 The
client's recourse to his lawyer would be inhibited and the lawyer's reply would be incomplete if the degree of protection
were not equal. It would indeed be a contradiction if documents containing legal advice were protected but documents
on which the provision of that advice was based were not. In
fact, two of the documents relating to the case, Nos. 1 and 5,
which the Court held to be protected by privilege, were letters
from AM & S to independent English solicitors requesting
legal advice. There is no doubt, therefore, that all documents
exchanged between lawyer and client, irrespective of whether
they were drafted by the former or the latter, are protected
provided they satisfy the other conditions laid down by the
Court.
104. Reasons of expediency clearly influenced the Court's thinking. Legal advice given in order to solve problems created by a country's accession to the Community seems to warrant a slight deviation from the conditions laid down by the Court
for protection of confidentiality. One can therefore justifiably expect similar treatment in the future for cases connected with the accession of Greece, Spain or Portugal. An equally probable explanation, of course, is that this discrepancy escaped the
Court's attention.
105. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
106. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611-12, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059-60 (Grounds 23 and 27
of the Judgment).
107. See id. at 1610, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9050 (Ground 18 of theJudgment).
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There is a common principle in both common law and
civil law countries that confidentiality also protects communications exchanged to or by the lawyer's clerks, assistants or
agents under the lawyer's authority for the purpose of rendering legal services. Adoption of this principle of confidentiality
by the Community would not seem to create any legal
problems, provided that the lawyer bears the burden of proof
that his assistants or agents acted under his authority and for
the purpose of rendering his services. With regard to the client acting also through servants or agents the position would
apparently be the same as for the lawyer. °"
When the Court laid down the three conditions mentioned above with respect to the protection of confidentiality it
was considering protection chiefly from the lawyer's standpoint.
For this reason, with the exception of the condition that the
client's rights of defense be respected, the other conditions do
not appear to refer directly to the client. If we look at the matter of confidentiality from the client's viewpoint, this would
raise the question whether the conditions for protection are
the same, fewer, or perhaps different from those applying to
the lawyer.
To begin with, the term client within this context covers
both natural and legal persons, and in the latter case the communications exchanged with the lawyer must emanate from the
persons authorized to represent them by law or by their constitution.'0 9
The condition requiring that the client's rights of defence
be observed does not appear to create any particular problem.
When a client requests legal advice from his lawyer, he will
have to act for the purposes and in the interests of his rights of
defense. Furthermore, the second condition will oblige firms
108. In the case of corporate clients acting through servants or agents, see infra
note 109 and accompanying text.
109. See mutatis mutandis Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 2501 (art. 11 (4)). This seems to be the normal practice of corporate clients
where lower or middle-ranking personnel do not usually have the power to request
legal advice from outside counsel. The persons authorized to represent a corporation by the law or its constitution may, however, delegate their right of representation or the right to conclude certain agreements to other servants or agents of the
corporation. The risks of abuse by according legal privilege to corporate clients were
largely averted in Community law by the Court's decision to deprive in-house lawyers
of the right to confidentiality. See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
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to request legal advice from, or put their defence in the hands
of, independent lawyers when they consider that the provision
of oral advice by the in-house lawyers is inadequate to meet the
needs of the case in question. Finally, as for the application of
the third condition, before companies seek legal advice from a
lawyer they will have to satisfy themselves that the lawyer is
both a member of a bar of, or has the right to practice his profession in, a Member State. Companies located outside Community territory will also be bound by this condition where
their activities are liable to produce effects within the Community or where they have branches and subsidiaries established
in Community territory.
5. The Place of Residence of the Client or Lawyer as a
Criterion for Protection
In Ground 25 of the Judgment the Court states that "the
protection thus afforded by Community law.., to written communications between lawyer and client must apply without distinction to any lawyer entitled to practise his profession in one
of the Member States, regardless of the Member State in which
the client lives." ' 0 At first sight, this paragraph seems to imply that the client must be resident in a Member State before
his communication is considered protected by legal privilege.
But the competition rules embodied in the EEC Treaty also
extend to companies whose seat or registered office is outside
the territorial limits of the Community."' It would thus be a
contradiction if on the one hand, activities of foreign companies, giving rise to consequences within the Community, fall
within the provisions of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
but, on the other hand, they did not benefit from the protection of confidentiality simply because their seat or registered
office is located outside the Community. For this reason it
would be more accurate to say that the general principle protecting the confidentiality of written communications between
110. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer

Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)

8757, at 9060.

111. Where a firm has its registered office outside the Community and exercises
no activities in the Community through branches or subsidiaries, the Commission's
power to conduct an investigation pursuant to article 14 of Regulation 17 is virtually
non-existent. It may do so only with the consent of the firm and the Member State in
which the firm's registered office is located.
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lawyer and client applies regardless of the place where the client
resides or where the company has its seat or registered office,
even where it is located outside the Community.
Furthermore, the same must apply with regard to the
place where the lawyer resides. An independent lawyer registered with a bar or lawyers' society in a Member State will not
need to locate his professional residence or, in the case of a
firm of lawyers, its seat or registered office, within the Community for the communication to be deemed to be protected by
legal privilege, provided that this lawyer is subject to the rules
of professional ethics and discipline of one of the Member
States. Only three Member States, Belgium, West Germany
and Luxembourg, require the lawyer to be established in the
State of which he is national before he is entitled to register
with a bar in that State.
Document No. 7 in AM & S Europe, which the Court held
to be protected by legal privilege, contained legal advice given
by an independent English solicitor to a firm other than AM
& S. This other firm was part of the same group of companies
and had its registered office in Australia. Document No. 7 was
found in the possession of AM & S while the Commission's
investigation was taking place. The Court therefore seems to
corroborate in practice the view that confidentiality of written
communications between lawyer and client is protected no
matter where the client or lawyer have their registered office,
even where it is outside the Community's territorial limits.
6. Possession of the Documents as a Criterion for Protection
In almost all cases, the problem of privilege will he closely
linked to documents found in the client's possession, i.e. in the
company's offices where Commission inspectors have conducted an investigation on the strength of article 14 of Regulation 17.112 A logical consequence of a privilege that covers
communications between lawyer and client and vice versa is
that such a communication should be protected by the Commission officials conducting the investigation regardless of the
person in whose hands it is found. As soon as all of the
Court's conditions for incorporation of this general principle
into Community law have been met, the mechanism of legal
1i12. See Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON

MKT'. REP.

(CCH) 12401.
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privilege takes effect automatically. This will occur irrespective
of whether the communication is in the hands of the client or
in the possession of the lawyer.
In accordance with article 14 of Regulation 17,113 the
Commission officials may investigate only premises of the firm,
i.e. all premises, land and means of transport belonging to it.
Commission officials may not, however, enter premises not
used in connection with a company's activities. The offices of a
firm's in-house lawyer, which is the company's legal department and forms part of its establishment, is subject to the
Commission's powers of investigation. On the other hand, the
office of an independent lawyer who is merely affording legal
14
advice to the firm is not directly subject to those powers.'
Thus, while the legal privilege of written communications in
the hands of the lawyer has never been called into question by
any of the laws of the Member States, the Court's ruling in
AM & S Europe also confirmed protection of communications
found in the possession of the client.
Certain questions still remain unresolved: is the confidentiality of a communication protected when it is not in the hands
of the client or his lawyer, but in the possession of a third party?
Does the manner in which that party got hold of the papers
have any significance? Finally, if the third party forwarded
those documents to the Commission, can the Commission
then be restrained from using those documents when making
its decision?
AM & S Document No. 7 contained advice initially given
by an independent English solicitor to a firm belonging to the
same group" 15 as AM & S, but not to AM & S directly. This
document, which the Court held to be protected by legal privilege, was found to be at the premises of AM & S during the
investigation by Commission officials. One view is that the
113. Id.
114. Incriminating documents that the firm passed either to the offices of an
independent lawyer or any other place outside its premises (e.g., the director's home)
in order to avoid a possible investigation by Community officials have to be produced
or sent to the Commission at the Commission's request. If such a request is not
complied with, the Commission may request the assistance of the national authorities
pursuant to article 14(6) of Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2531, (art. 14(6)). The law to be applied in this case is the domestic law on investigations or seizure of documents of the Member State concerned.
115. See supra note 3.
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Court took into account, in this case, the interests of the group
as a whole." 6 Thus, documents originally addressed to one
member of the group and later found in the possession of another member of the same group of companies will be immune
from scrutiny. Another view, however, is that the Court's protection of AM & S Document No. 7 indicated its intention to
extend protection even to papers in the hands of a third party.
The other conditions referred to above however must be satisfied and the papers must not have lost their confidential nature
as a result of passing into the possession of the third party.
This third party need not have any connection with the
lawyer-client relationship. For example, a firm with which the
client had previously concluded an agreement or concerted
practice' 1 7 or a competitor, would be protected by legal privilege. Under English law, documents acquired by means of
either a third party, as a result of a violation of the lawyer's
duties, or by unlawful means (e.g., theft of the original), may
be accepted as evidence. Those documents or the originals
will, in the initial stages, be protected by privilege." 8 By contrast, in French law, documents of this kind may not be used as
legal evidence, as this would be detrimental to the client's
rights of defence. 9
The Court decided in Ground 23 of the Judgment that
protection of confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client constitutes an essential corollary of the
latter's rights of defence. Does that mean, however, that confidentiality should benefit from the same system of protection as
rights of defence which, as a general principle of Community
116. The same was suggested by Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn in AM & S
Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1661, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH)

8757, at 9089.

117. Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty states that "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States" are prohibited if their object or effect is to restrict competition. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at 32, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48 (emphasis
added).
118. See R. CRoss, supra note 31, at 291-95; Peiris, supra note 9, at 630-33; The
Position of English law on this particular point is subject to severe criticism. See Heydon, Legal Professional Privilege and Third Parties, 37 MOD. L. REV. 601 (1974); Peiris,
supra note 9, at 633; LAW REFORM COMMITTEE SIXTEENTH REPORT, CMD. 3472, at 13-

14 (1967) (privilege in civil proceedings).
119. See Judgment of Apr. 28, 1982, Cour d'Appel, Versailles, 1982 J.O. Nos.
146-47, [1982] 1 GAZ. PAL. 310.
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law and a fundamental human right, bind the Commission?
Acceptance of this view would mean that the Commission
would be obliged to take account ex officio of the confidentiality
of written communications, and that it cannot use the contents
of these communications as a basis for deciding that there had
been an infringement of competition rules of the EEC Treaty.
It is submitted, however, that Commission decisions implementing articles 85 and 86 will not automatically be declared
invalid simply because the contents of the documents so acquired by the Commission were used as a basis for its decisions. Interested parties may have to seek protection before
the Court ofJustice by bringing an action for annulment under
article 173 of the EEC Treaty 2 ° regarding the relevant Commission decisions. The Court adopted a similar approach to
another right of defence of the undertakings (the right of access to the file) in the Hoffman-La Roche case.1 21 Definitive answers cannot be given to all of these questions. The Court undoubtedly has direct interest in the question of whether the
three conditions it laid down for protection of legal privilege
are fulfilled simultaneously. A person claiming legal privilege
for a document must have some legitimate interest in its protection.
7. The Type of Communication as a Criterion for Protection
Throughout its judgment, the Court repeats the phrase
"confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and
client." It is unclear whether this phrase embraces all types of
written communication that may in practice constitute contact
between lawyer and client. Aside from the traditional forms of
communication, i.e., a letter, either party may resort to other
more modern means such as telegrams, telex, magnetic tapes
or computerized electronic messages. Does legal privilege
then extend to all these forms of communication? The Court
gave a very broad meaning to the term business records referred
120. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, (art. 173).
121. See Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 513, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8527, at 7539 (Ground 15 of theJudgment).
The Court's decision on this point, however, has been strongly criticised. See Walker,
Hoffman-La Roche-The Judgment of the European Court Appraised, 1979 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 357; C.S. KERSE, supra note 36, at 98.
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to in article 14(1) of Regulation 17.122 This term includes all
written communications exchanged between lawyer and client
to the extent that they have a bearing on "the market activities
of the undertaking."1 23 If we follow the Court's interpretation,
then there is no doubt that protection of confidentiality does
extend to all the aforementioned types of written communication.
The question whether legal privilege also covers oral communications exchanged between lawyer and client presents a
number of problems. Although the Commission is empowered under article 14 of Regulation 17 to examine only the
company's books and other business records, from a legal
standpoint oral communications should enjoy the same protection afforded written communications. This subject would assume importance if the Commission exercised broader investigatory powers, such as the power to examine and take sworn
or unsworn testimonies from witnesses. This power is not exercised at present under Community law but is permitted, for
the relevant authorities, in the national competition laws of
certain Member States. However, under article 14(1)(c) of
Regulation 17 Commission officials are empowered to request
oral explanations on the spot when investigating a firm. One
view is that "on the spot" means during the investigation and
not at a later stage. Moreover, there is virtually total agreement in the legal literature that the oral explanations should
result directly from the books and other business records
which happen to be under investigation. 12 4 Thus, the issue
arises whether employees can refuse to answer questions put
by Commission officials when doing so would disclose information covered by legal privilege. The view advocated by this
author is that they are quite justified, in such an instance, in
refusing to do so. The fact that in one case the legal advice
appears in writing or print in a business document while in the
other it exists only in the memory of an employee of the firm
should not lead to different treatment in terms of protection of
122. Regulation 17, supra note 2, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2531 (art.
14(i)).
123. See AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1609-10, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059.
124. See C.S. KERSE, supra note 36, at 82-83. But see Kreis, EEC Commission Investigation Proceduresin Competition Cases, 17 INT'L LAW. 19, 40-41 (1983).
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confidentiality. The only difficulty in protecting the confidentiality of oral communications would seem to stem from the verbal nature of communications, which, unlike written ones, are
more prone to the risks of abuse and more difficult for the
Commission to verify effectively in practice.
Quite often, the complex nature of agreements or concerted practices of firms, such as transactions involving mergers or joint ventures, require lawyers to be present at the negotiating table to offer immediate oral advice. In such cases
the lawyers' advice is recorded in the minutes of the meeting,
which are usually kept by employees of the firms. Assuming
that all the other conditions laid down by the Court are met,
the question arises whether the oral advice which was not written and dispatched immediately by the lawyer but was recorded in the minutes of the meeting by an employee of the
firm is covered by legal privilege.
Advocate-General Sir Gordon Slynn stated in AM & S Europe that legal privilege should cover the contents of advice
given either orally or in writing irrespective of how it is recorded, be it in a letter, summary, notes or minutes. 25 The
Court, however, takes a somewhat different view. AM & S Document No. 12 in the case in question was an internal memorandum sent by an AM & S executive to another executive in the
same firm. It contained a summary of the legal advice previously given to AM & S by an independent English solicitor.
The Court decided that the memorandum was not protected,
even though it was a summary of legal advice given initially by
an independent solicitor. Is it not inconsistent to afford protection to a document which the lawyer sent to the firm while
not protecting the content of the same document when it is
reproduced by employees of the same firm? ' 26 The Court's decision in this matter seems to be unjustified and could easily
lead to an undermining of legal privilege itself. Although the
Court's decision on this point was not directly concerned with
oral advice, one is forced to conclude that the oral advice recorded in the minutes, in the example above, will not be protected either. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, in principle,
125. AM &S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1655, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9085.
126. See Goffin, supra note 53, at 402.
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oral communications between lawyer and client should enjoy
the same degree of protection as written communications for
the additional reason that they are protected on the same footing as written communications in the domestic law of the Member States.
C. Waiver and Loss of the Protection of Confidentiality
One aspect of privilege which is superficially discussed by
the Court is the waiver of the right to protection. Oddly
enough, the circumstances in which privilege is lost are not
even touched upon, apparently because they were not at issue
in AM & S Europe. The Court opined that the principle of confidentiality may be waived by the client where he considers it in
his interest to do so.' 2 7 This ruling brings the Community
principle of confidentiality more into line with English law.
Under English law the principle of confidentiality is considered
to be a privilege of the client and only he may waive it. In
contrast, in most Member States in continental Europe the
privilege belongs to the lawyer and he alone is entitled to
waive it.
In theory, the ultimate purpose of privilege is to encourage clients to consult their lawyers without constraint, free
from the fear that the confidence so entrusted will later be disclosed. The underlying rationale is that a lawyer can defend
his client's interests properly only if he avails himself of all relevant information. However, if the client divulges confidential
information to a third party, it is presumed that he would also
have divulged it to his lawyer even without the protection of
privilege. Once the privileged information has been disclosed,
therefore, the basic justification for protection no longer applies, and the privilege is considered to have been waived.
Conversely, if the person to whom the privilege belongs wishes
to preserve it, he must take some affirmative action to preserve
confidentiality.
A waiver of privilege may be either express or implied, deliberate or unintentional, partial or total.12 8 The ruling of the
Court of Justice seems to refer only to express or deliberate
127. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1613, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9060 (Ground 28 of the Judgment).
128. See generally 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2327.
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disclosure of the whole of the written communications to
which the privilege is attached. In practice, however, it is unintentional, inadvertent or erroneous disclosures which raise the
most difficult questions. Implied waiver by deliberate disclosure of the communications or other supporting materials
poses no major identification problems. Partial waiver, which
is not allowed under English law should not be allowed at the
Community level. To allow a client to reveal only certain parts
of a confidential communication, presumably those parts most
favourable to his cause, and to assert privilege as to the remainder, would tend to transform the privilege from a shield
to a sword to be used9 offensively in order to paint a one-sided
2
picture of the facts. 1
It remains to be seen, however, whether inadvertent or
unintentional disclosure of confidential communications by a
company's employee will constitute waiver of privilege. In
such a case, French law would not consider it a waiver, while
under common law, knowledge or lack of knowledge of the
existence of privilege appears to be irrelevant. A question
arises, however, in the case where documents, otherwise protected by privilege, are sent to the Commission by the employees of a firm. 3 ' It appears that this should not be considered a
constituted waiver since the privilege is a right of the company
and not of the individual employee.
In regard to the circumstances in which the right to protection of confidentiality is deemed to be lost, it is a well-established principle of English law that legal advice or assistance
obtained for the purpose of aiding in the commission of a
crime or perpetration of a fraud is not privileged. Since the

privilege is that of the client, his guilt deprives him of the right
to protection whether or not his lawyer is privy. Under English
law, a prima facie case that the communications in question
were made in preparation of, in furtherance of, or as part of, a
129. See Peiris, supra note 9, at 637; Comment, Stufing the Rabbit Back into the Hat:
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1208 (1982).

130. See Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 461, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 8527, at 7503; Bennett, Current Survey, Hoffman-LaRoche: Abuse of Dominance on the Vitamins Market Confirmed, 4 EUR. L. REV. 210, 221

(1979); see also S.G. Adams v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. number 145/83; not yet reported).

(case
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criminal act or fraud is all that must be established. 3 ' Under
French law, on the other hand, the general rule is that privilege
is lost if the lawyer assists his client or personally takes part in

his illegal activities. 132
Both jurisdictions, however, distinguish legal advice obtained in preparation for the commission of a crime or illegal
activity from legal advice obtained after the event for the legitimate purpose of defence. Protection of confidentiality of the
communications between lawyer and client is assured only in
the second category. The precise boundaries of this distinction, however, are less clearly defined than its principle. Serious problems still exist regarding legal services originally
solicited for a lawful purpose and subsequently used for an unlawful end.
Community competition law does not typically concern itself with criminal law. For this reason, the wider concept of
illegal activities used by French law would seem to be more
appropriate. 1 3 On the other hand, it could not be said that
the lawyer, in assisting his client to commit a breach or to
evade the competition rules embodied in the EEC Treaty, is
acting within the framework of his client's rights of defence
and contributing to the proper administration of justice in the
Community. For these reasons, adoption of the common features of the national laws described above would seem to constitute a reasonable approach with respect to the circumstances
in which the right to privilege is deemed to be lost.
D.

The Procedure to be Followed in Affording Protection to
Confidentiality in EEC Competition Law

Having recognized the general principle of confidentiality
and incorporated it into Community law, the Court of Justice
naturally turned its attention to the procedure to be followed
in applying the principle of confidentiality in practise. The
Court stated that "it is in principle for the Commission itself,
and not the undertaking concerned or a third party, whether
131. See Butler v. Board of Trade, [1970] 3 All E.R. 593, 598.
132. See Judgment of Feb. 3, 1983, Cour d'Appel, Aix-en-Provence, [19831 2
GAZ. PAL. 11.

133. The Commission's submissions were similar in AM & S Europe, 1982 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1588, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9045.
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an expert or an arbitrator, to decide whether or not a document must be produced to it."' 4 When a firm is, however, being investigated by the Commission's authorized officials and,
therefore, wishes accordingly to claim legal privilege for certain documents which it has exchanged with its lawyer, it must
produce "relevant material of such a nature as to demonstrate
that the communications fulfill the conditions for being
granted legal protection ....
"3'
This seems to suggest two
things: first, that a simple assertion on the part of a company
that all the prerequisites for the protection of confidentiality
had been met would not be sufficient in the event of disagreement between the company and the Commission officials; and
second, that the firm would not be obliged to disclose the
whole contents of the documents at issue. "Relevant material," however, could lead to confusing interpretation of the
lawyer client privilege. For instance, how could it be shown
that the communication between lawyer and client was made
for the purposes of the client's rights of defence without at the
same time disclosing the whole contents of the communication? Whereas it is relatively easy to establish the independence of a lawyer, the question of establishing exactly when
the communication was exchanged for the purpose of the client's rights of defence is likely to be more problematic.
Despite the practical difficulties, if the Commission's officials deem the documents produced to be satisfactory, this
would seem to be the end of the affair and the entire contents
of the document would not have to become known to the officials. If the parties disagree, however, the only recourse open
to the Commission is to order the firm, pursuant to article
14(3) of Regulation 17, "either to supply such additional evidence as the Commission considers necessary or to produce
the communications in question whose confidentiality, in the
' 36
Commission's view, is not protected in law."'
The firms concerned may, if they so wish, contest the
Commission decision on the basis of article 173 of the EEC
134. See id. at 1610, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9059 (Ground 17 of the Judgment).
135. Id. at 1613, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9060 (Ground 29 of the Judgment) (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 1613, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9061 (Ground 31 of the Judgment).
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Treaty. Although this kind of recourse does not have a suspensory effect 13 7 (i.e., the firm will still be obliged to produce
the documents or additional evidence demanded by the Commission), it may request the Court to take interim measures of
protection where certain other conditions are met. 138
Since AM & S Europe, the Court has become the only body
competent to give a definitive judgment on the protection of
confidentiality in cases where the application of the protection
is disputed between the Commission officials and the undertaking whose premises are being investigated. This is due to
the fact that the Commission is acting "in a field as vital to the
functioning of the Common Market as that of compliance with
the rules on competition, the solution of disputes ... may be
sought only at Community level."' 39 This is reasonable to the
extent that the Court has, as the supreme judicial institution,
the final say in interpreting Community law. This does not, on
the other hand, seem to pose problems for the speedy administration ofjustice. 4 ° It could, however, make the Court ofJustice into a court of first instance, a notion that was definitely
not intended by the Treaties establishing the European Com4
munity.' 1
137. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, (art. 85).
138. See Gray, Interim Measures of Protection in the European Court, 4 EUR.L. REV. 80
(1979).
139. AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1613, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8757, at 9060 (Ground 30 of the Judgment)
(emphasis added).
140. Although the procedure before the Court lasted about two and a half years,
it is hoped that the procedure in AM & S Europe will be much shorter in the future
because, in the event of an application to the Court, the case can be decided by a
chamber. Moreover, as happened in AM & S Europe, documents may be examined
only by the Advocate-General and the Judge-Rapporteur. There is not a lengthy
lapse of time where an application for interim measures is submitted, since the application is usually decided only by the President of the Court.
141. See National Carbonising Co. v. Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1193, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 457; see also AM & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
at 1586-87, 1598, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at
9044, 9052; Kuyper & van Rijn, supra note 38, at 15.
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II. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCESAND FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE
RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
The importance of AM & S Europe resides in the fact that
the Court incorporated a general principle, common to the
laws of the Member States, into Community law, notwithstanding the fact that the extent and the criteria for applying it were
found to vary widely from country to country. When the Court
laid down the conditions for incorporation and application of
the general principle in Community law, however, it based its
conclusions solely on those elements of the principle common
to the laws of the different Member States. The consequence
of this was not only the abandonment of the practice followed
of incorporating the most "progressive solution"' 4 2 into Community law, but also the imposition of conditions which are not
entirely justifiable. Indeed, one may wonder whether it would
not have been more appropriate for the Court merely to have
acknowledged the existence of the principle of confidentiality
in Community law and to have left to the Community legislature the task of defining its scope and limits.' 4 3
The most important consequence of the judgment lies in
the limitation of the powers of investigation conferred on the
Commission by article 14 of Regulation 17. However, it
should be stressed that the effects of the Court's ruling are in
practice less important than they appear to be. The Court of
Justice did not rule that all the communications exchanged between lawyer and client are protected by the principle of confidentiality but only those which meet the fairly restrictive conditions it imposed.
Although the Court made no specific mention of it, protection of confidentiality will have to be applied, mutatis mutandis, in the framework of the Commission's powers to collect
142. See H. KUTSCHER, METHODES D'INTERPRETATION VUES D'UNJUGE DE LA COUR

29 (1976).
143. This was done by the Court ofJustice with regard to the general principle
of limitation periods in Community competition law in Boehringer Mannehim GmbH
v. Commission, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 769, 795, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8085, at 8221, 8242; and in ICI, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 653, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161, at
8001, 8026.
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information on the strength of article 11 of the same Regulation. Confidentiality will presumably also apply in the case of
investigations carried out by the competent authorities of the
Member States on the strength of article 13 of Regulation 17.
It should be noted, however, that in the course of these investigations the national authorities will be applying their domestic
rules on procedure (including the rules on legal privilege)
while enforcing EEC substantive law on competition. 4 4 Inquiries into sectors of the economy on the basis of article 12 of
Regulation 17 would appear to present a greater number of
problems. It is generally admitted that this type of inquiry
does not constitute initiation of the procedure in the sense indicated earlier in this paper. 4 5 It is therefore debatable
whether the communications exchanged between an undertaking and an independent lawyer, in order to enable the former
to reply innocuously to questions put by the Commission on
the strength of article 12, will be deemed to have been made
for the company's rights of defence, and thus to be protected
by the principle of confidentiality. It is submitted here that the
company will be entitled to claim protection for those communications which, if requested in the course of investigations
under article 14 of the Regulation, would have been held to be
protected by confidentiality. The Court considered the principle applicable even to communications exchanged before the
initiation of the administrative procedure if they have "a rela46
tionship to the subjet-matter of that procedure."'
It remains to be seen whether the AM & S Europe judgment will trigger demands for the protection of confidentiality
in other fields, such as: the competition rules of the European
Coal and Steel Treaty, 4 7 the Euratom Treaty; 4 1 the an144. SeeJ. THEISING, H. SCHROTER & J.F. HOCHBAUM, LES ENTENTES ET LES POC.E.E. 515-17 (Jupiter ed. 1977).
145. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
146. See AM &S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1611, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder) COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9060 (Ground 23 of theJudgment).
147. Compare Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr.
18, 1951, 1973 GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189) (official English translation), 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (1958) (unofficial English translation) (arts. 65(3) and 66(4)) with id.
(arts. 47 and 86); see also Decision No. 14-64, [1963-64 Special Edition] O.J. EUR.
COMM. 162 (8 July 1964); Commission Decision No. 379/84/ECSC of 15 February
1984, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 46) 23 (1984).
148. See Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Commission, Mar. 25,
1957, 1973 GR. BRIT. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 169 (arts. 81 and 82).
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tidumping investigations under Regulation 2176/84 14 " and
Decision 2177/84;'11 or, the cases under article 213 of the

EEC Treaty and under other general principles of law such as
self-incrimination. '' It is submitted that the wording of the
Court's judgment in AM & S Europe does not exclude such a
possibility. 152The impact of AM & S Europe on undertakings and associations of undertakings operating within the Community is very
significant. They will either have to confine themselves to oral
advice from their in-house lawyers or seek counsel from independent lawyers if they wish their communications to benefit
from legal privilege. They may also have to take appropriate
measures when Commission officials are conducting an investigation on their premises to ensure that communications exchanged with their lawyers and undertaken in order to fulfill
the conditions laid down by the Court do not inadvertently (or
due to their own ignorance) come into the hands of Commission officials. This could be achieved through appropriate organization of the firm's archives (perhaps by filing strictly legal
papers separately from commercial papers) or through the
presence of a lawyer operating in a supervisory capacity during
the investigation. Provision of adequate information to employees of the firm empowered to represent it or bind it vis-avis third parties, particularly as regards the procedure to be
followed in protecting confidentiality, will make an effective
contribution to safeguarding legal privilege.
For national lawyers' associations in general, and the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the EEC
in particular, the need to take measures to inform their members is all too obvious. It would be expedient for the Consultative Committee, in its capacity as the association representing
lawyers at Community level, to take timely measures to harmonise the rules of professional ethics and discipline in all Member States. This would perhaps constitute the first step to149. 27 O.J.
150. Id.

EUR. COMM.

(No. L 201) 1 (1984).

15 1. See Community Report: Due Process in the Administrative Procedure, 3 FEDERATION

11-5 (1978) (contribution of C.D.
Ehlerman and D. Oldekop).
152. SeeAtM! & S Europe, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1610, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757, at 9059 (Ground 18 of theJudgment).
INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DROIT EUROPtEN I I-1, at

52

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

wards the extension of legal privilege in the future to in-house
lawyers.
Such an ideal objective would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve in the near future since this would also
necessitate the harmonisation of the laws on the exercise of the
legal profession. It may be argued that, if in-house lawyers'
associations in all Member States succeed in bringing their
members within rules of professional ethics and discipline similar to those of independent lawyers, the Community might be
willing to extend protection of confidentiality to in-house lawyers, even if they are not in fact registered with a bar.
At the legislative level, the Community is confronted at
present with the question of whether protection of confidentiality should also be extended to lawyers from non-Member
States and, if so, in what way. It is suggested here that in order
to achieve this aim the Commission may have to consider one
or more of the following approaches: (a) it can adopt internal
Community legislation; (b) it could resort to modes of international cooperation by concluding international agreements and
treaties of a bilateral or multilateral nature with interested
non-Member States; and (c) it could explore the use of a conflict-of-laws approach.
The first two approaches entail a number of possible
courses of action. Under the first approach the Commission
may concede protection of confidentiality to non-Member
State lawyers by: 1) issuing a non-binding administrative declaration to that effect on the part of the Commission alone or,
preferably, all the Community institutions in terms analogous
to those of the common declaration for the protection of
human rights in the Community; 5 3 2) making appropriate
amendments to the relevant provisions of Regulation 17; and
3) proposing a new Regulation to deal exclusively with all the
questions arising from the protection of confidentiality in the
Community.' 5 4 Under the second approach the Commission
may choose from among the following options: 1) to accede
153. 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 130) 1 (1977). In this case, proceedings before
the Court ofJustice will also be covered. See Faull, Legal Professional Privilege (AM &
S): The Commission Proposes InternationaliVegotialions, 10 EUR. L. REV. 119 (1985).
154. The same occurred with Commission Regulation 2988/74, 17 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1974), concerning limitation periods in competition proceedings.
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to, or propose, non-binding instruments of international cooperation, such as the OECD Recommendation on cooperation
between Member countries on restrictive business practices affecting international trade,15 5 or the USA-Canada Understanding; 15 ' 2) to conclude international agreements of a bilateral
nature, such as the USA-West Germany agreement relating 1 to
57
mutual cooperation regarding restrictive business practices;
or to propose the conclusion of similar agreements of a multilateral nature;15 and 3) to become a party to the existing international conventions dealing with this matter, such as the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
and Commercial Matters of 1970.159 Finally, under the third
approach, the Commission would not be required to take any
concrete legislative measures, but instead would have to adopt
the solutions to be decided by the conflict-of-laws approach in
each individual case.
The Commission recently decided to recommend to the
Council the opening of negotiations with non-Member States
for the conclusion of international agreements in accordance
with the procedure provided for in article 228 of the EEC
Treaty. 160 This choice will be better understood if the question
of extending legal privilege to non-Member States lawyers is
placed within the factual and legal framework within which the
155. See

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COM-

PETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT:
INFORMATION,

INTERNATIONAL

CO-OPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF

Annex 1 (1984) (adopted by the Council at its 501st meeting on Sept.

25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as "COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT"].
156. COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 155, Annex IV, at 113.
157. See id. at 115.
158. As to the question whether these may be considered to be "mixed" agreements, see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
159. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
7444 [hereinafter cited as the "Hague Convention on Evidence"]. The Convention
has been ratified by Denmark, France, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. For an original analysis, see Amram,
Explanator Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Mlatters, 12 I.L.M. 327 (1973). For more recent accounts dealing with the Convention, see in particular Borel & Boyd, Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence
in Francefor Use in Litigating in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35 (1979); Collins, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in Englandfor Use in Litigating in the United
States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1979); Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of
Germany: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on German-Americanjudicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465 (1983).
160. See COM(84) 548 final, supra note 97.
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Commission's power to collect information is most likely to
arise. For this purpose two broad categories of factual situations may be distinguished.
It is useful to keep in mind that as a universally established
rule, the laws of every sovereign authority have force and produce legal effects within the boundaries of its state and bind all
subject to it, but not beyond. 1 " Accordingly, the Court's ruling in AM & S Europe cannot be considered to have modified
the right of protection of confidentiality of non-Member States
lawyers and clients established outside the territorial limits of
the Community. It must also be recalled here that requests for
the supply of information and documents sent by the Commission on the strength of article 11 of Regulation 17 to a company established outside the EEC can be lawfully refused by
the company apart from the fact that the non-Member State in
whose territory the company is established may consider such
a request to represent an unlawful exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by the Commission and to constitute an infringement of its national sovereignty.' 6 2 On the other hand, the
Commission may not dispute the assertion of legal privilege by
claiming that some of the conditions for the application of the
Community principle of confidentiality were not fulfilled if the
company decides to abide by the Commission's request by supplying certain documents and refusing others on the ground
that they are protected by legal privilege under its domestic
law. As a matter of law, the Commission is obliged in such
cases to observe moderation and self-restraint and take into
account the substantive laws and procedural rules in the foreign forum when exercising its investigatory powers to obtain
information in the possession of persons abroad. Accordingly,
the resolution of such conflicts cannot depend on the adoption
of unilateral legislative measures by the Community because
16 1. See Maier, Extrateritorialinrisdiction at a Crossroads: an Intersection Between Pubfir and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 282 (1982); Mann, The doctrine
of internationaljrisdiction revisited after twenty years, 186 RECEUIL DES COURS, 19, 20
(1984).
162. There is no controversey that the taking of formal action on foreign territory which is manifestly a part of the performance of official functions, or which includes an element of constraint, is generally unacceptable in the absence of an international agreement between the countries involved. See Meessen, Antitrust irisdictioi
under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 790 (1984); COMPETIrIoN
LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 155, at 40-41.
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they will infringe the rules of international law and the generally accepted principles of sovereignty, comity and fairness that
govern cooperation between states in this field. The solution
should be reached instead by exploring the appropriate modes
of international cooperation. Non-binding instruments of international cooperation such as the OECD Recommendation
or the USA-Canada Understanding," 3 which can be agreed
upon more easily and are considered to be a useful first step
towards the conclusion of further binding international agreements of a bilateral or multilateral nature, could regulate the
question of both substantive and investigatory jurisdiction in
antitrust matters.
The Hague Convention on Evidence"" 4 is also important,
particularly in cases where the national courts or competition
authorities of the Member States are those who apply articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty,' 6 5 and in cases under article 13 of
Regulation 17. In such cases information and documents in
the possession of persons abroad may be requested only by the
national court adjudicating the case by means of letters of re67
Article 11 of the Hague Convention on Evidence'
quest.'
allows for the protection of legal privilege under the laws of
both the requesting and requested State, and even of third
states. It would appear that the Community can, in principle,
68
become a member of the Hague Convention on Evidence,
although the question whether it would be opportune to do so,
and under what conditions, needs to be studied further and
9
falls outside the ambit of this article.'6
163. See COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 155.
164. Supra note 159.
165. Taking into account the fact that articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty are considered to be directly applicable, national courts and authorities remain competent to
apply and enforce Community competition. BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 51, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8269, at 9185-389186.
166. See Borel & Boyd, supra note 159, at 38-4 1; Collins, supra note 159, at 2930; Shemanski, supra note 159, at 469; Sutherland, The Use of the Leiter of Request (or
Letter Rogatory) for the Purpose of ObtainingEvidencefor Proceedings in England and Abroad,
31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 784 (1982).

167. Supra note 154.
168. Id.
169. The chief fact militating against the Community's accession to the Convention is that the Commission is not a court and, as a rule, the Convention is considered
not to apply to pre-trial discovery or to administrative proceedings. Certain of these
obstacles are, however, being disputed. But see Borel & Boyd, supra note 154, at 37-
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Secondly, the approach would be different in the case of
third-country lawyers and clients who are established within
the European Community or in the case of multinational companies with subsidiaries in the EEC. These lawyers are effectively subject to the provisions of the Community principle of
confidentiality and, as was explained earlier, 7 ' legal documents found at the premises of these companies that emanate
from such lawyers are not protected by legal privilege.
In the intermediate cases where the business documents
which the Commission is seeking to obtain from a company
inside the EEC country are located at the parent company's or
a subsidiary's offices outside Community territory, the Commission may, by using the "enterprise unity" doctrine, send requests for the supply of information through the company
which is established in the EEC. This may be done whether it
be the subsidiary or the parent company of a multinational
group and whichever of the two is the actual subject of the inquiry, provided that the market behaviour of those companies
produces direct and substantial effects within the Community. 17 1 As a matter of either law or policy, these requests generally rely on voluntary cooperation by the parties. Moreover,
if the Commission tries to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the party in control of the documents or other evidence that is
located abroad, it may be faced with the defence that production of those documents would violate the law (including the
law on legal privilege) of the country that is the situs of the
evidence. If the Commission now wishes to extend protection
of confidentiality to legal documents connected with this type
of situation, it would have to concede protection to third-coun45; Collins, supra note 154, at 29-33; Shemanski, supra note 154, at 475; Sutherland,
supra note 166, at 790. The Community position would be modified, however, by the
expected establishment of an administrative tribunal of first instance to hear actions
against Commission decisions in the competition field. See Commission des Communaut6s Europ66nes, Programme de travail de la Commission, [1985 Supp.] BULLETIN

22 (presented to the European Parliament on Mar.
12, 1985). It is interesting to note that in the United Kingdom the Convention has
been extended to the European Court ofJustice, enabling evidence for proceedings
before the Court ofJustice to be taken at its request by U.K. courts. See The Evidence
(European Court) Order 1976, S.I. 1976 No. 428, reprinted in 7 HALSBURY'S STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS 299-300 (5th ed. 1985).
170. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
171. See ICI, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8161.
DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPfENES,
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try lawyers who are established or provide their legal services
in, or from within, the European Community. Such an extension could be achieved by the use of Community legislative instruments alone. The adoption of an administrative declaration by the Commission or, preferably, by all Community institutions, may be the simplest solution, but it would not create
binding rights. An amendment to Regulation 17, on the other
hand, although quite possible and actually urged by the European Parliament, 72 may risk a wider range of unwelcome
amendments to Regulation 17 and thus does not seem to be
desirable from the Commission's point of view.
The adoption of a new Regulation to deal exclusively with
the questions arising from the protection of legal privilege in
the Community may resolve a wider range of problems. These
include such problems as the question of according confidentiality to in-house lawyers; the waiver and loss of the right to
privilege; the extension of the principle in the framework of
other provisions of Regulation 17 (such as article 11 and, possibly, articles 12 and 13) and, in respect of other fields of Community law (such as in antidumping investigations, or in cases
73
involving article 213 of the EEC Treaty).
All these possible approaches would involve unilaterally
conceding protection of confidentiality to third-country lawyers without sufficient guarantee that EEC lawyers who are established or provide their legal services in third countries will
enjoy the same degree of protection. The fact that similar protection of legal privilege already exists in the legal system of
74
certain third countries and also extends to foreign lawyers
would seem to take away a substantial part of the problem of
reciprocity. However, the question posed above would remain
with regard to EEC lawyers who are established or provide
their services in third countries whose legal system does not
contain any rules or precedent protecting legal privilege or
where it does protect legal privilege such protection is not afforded to lawyers from foreign countries. The Commission
may make the application of the EEC principle of confidential172. See 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 127) 131 (1984) (European Parliament's
Resolution).
173. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
174. For a very interesting case in United States law, see Renfield Corp. v. E.
Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982).
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ity to third-country lawyers subject to the condition that similar
protection is accorded to EEC lawyers established or providing
their services in third countries by inserting an appropriate
provision in the Community legal instruments to be adopted.
In such cases, substantial and investigatory jurisdiction in antitrust matters will be decided by means of the conflict-of-laws
approach, and confidentiality will be accorded by the Community to third-country lawyers only on condition that EEC lawyers in the third country concerned enjoy the same or
equivalent right to protection."' However, it would appear
that the right of EEC lawyers will be best guaranteed only if
binding international agreements of a bilateral or multilateral
nature explicitly regulating the question of reciprocity are concluded.
It is important to examine the grounds advanced by the
Commission in its decision to propose to the Council that protection of confidentiality be extended to independent lawyers
from third countries by the conclusion of international agreements. Although the laws of some third countries already contain rules or abide by precedent on the protection of confidentiality similar or equivalent to those in Community law and
which also apply to communications with lawyers entitled to
practise in a Member State of the Community, the Commission
seems to be particularly concerned, following the Court's ruling in AM & S Europe, with whether at least some of those third
countries may amend their rules or procedures so as to with-6
7
draw the protection now afforded to Community lawyers.
What the Commission therefore appears to be seeking to
achieve by the conclusion of international agreements is to
safeguard the existing rights of Community lawyers in the provision of their legal services in third countries, or to facilitate
the exercise of the legal profession in third countries and only
indirectly to protect the principle of confidentiality in the application of the competition rules of the EEC Treaty.
The second argument advanced by the Commission for
extending protection of confidentiality to independent lawyers
175. The question of reciprocity will be decided in each particular case by providing sufficient proof that the law of the third country whose lawyer is seeking the
protection of confidentiality assures the same degree of protection in the same or
similar circumstances to lawyers from Member States of the Community.
176. See COM (84) 548 final, supra note 97 3.
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from third countries is based on the grounds of equity in international relations.1 77 Obviously, the Commission is acutely
aware of the international implications of the Court's Judgment on this point. Indeed, as was explained earlier, the legal
order of the Community may not question the validity of the
safeguards with respect to confidentiality applied by the legal
systems of third countries, neither can it "export" minimum
standards which must be observed for the protection of confidentiality to apply. At present, however, in those third countries which recognize the principle of confidentiality, EEC lawyers enjoy protection of confidentiality in virtually all fields of
law, whether civil, criminal, or administrative. The limited approach proposed by the Commission is therefore quite likely to
instigate amendments in the laws of third countries, which will
limit the protection of confidentiality only to their competition
rules. On the other hand, it is not certain whether all third
countries will respond to the Commission's call for the conclusion of bilateral agreements or whether clear-cut competition
rules exist in the legal systems of all the third countries. Furthermore, it cannot be argued that advising on competition law
problems amounts to the totality of the legal services provided
by EEC lawyers in third countries, nor that separation of advice on competition law from other advice on complex business transactions will always be easy for the protection of confidentiality to apply. Moreover, the notion of an independent
lawyer, i.e. a lawyer who is not bound to his client by a relationship of employment, will be defined each time by the national law of the state concerned, while the content of the rules
of professional ethics and discipline vary widely from one
Member State to the next. The question may arise, therefore,
as to which Member States law should serve as a basis for comparison in order to determine whether the law of a given third
country is similar or equivalent to Community standards. The
Commission's proposal to conclude bilateral agreements that
are limited only to EEC competition rules, is quite likely to disturb the existing norms of protection of confidentiality. It is
also likely to restrict the protection currently available to EEC
lawyers who provide services in non-Member States with re177. See Confidentiality of Legal Documents, supra note 97.

60

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

spect to the confidentiality of communications rather than to
the safeguarding of their rights.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations it may be
concluded that the proposed bilateral agreements with third
countries should not limit the protection of confidentiality to
the competition rules of the EEC Treaty. They should extend
it, on the basis of reciprocity, to all fields of law where there is
an equivalent system in the laws of third countries and Community law.' 78 This is necessary because if protection is now
limited to competition rules only, the Community may have to
modify those agreements every time a new question of protection or of concluding new agreements arises. In addition, the
wording of the agreements to be proposed should be sufficiently general to cover all the problems and discrepancies described earlier, otherwise their conclusion should be postponed until a harmonization of the national laws of the Member States in the respective fields is accomplished.
Another factor militating against the immediate conclusion of such bilateral agreements is that the Court's Judgment
is considered to be inconclusive and incomplete in certain aspects. Another opportunity should be given to the Court of
Justice to reconsider some aspects of the principle of confidentiality, unless either the Commission or the Council are prepared to obtain beforehand the opinion of the Court as to
whether the agreements so envisaged are compatible with the
provisions of Community law.' 79 It may be inferred from these
considerations that the kind of agreements actually proposed
by the Commission would be appropriate only for those third
countries where protection of confidentiality of communications exchanged between lawyer and client is either not recognized at all or is limited only to competition rules. By contrast,
in the case of third countries where protection of legal privilege is widely applied to all fields of law and to foreign lawyers,
it may be reasonably expected that the most the Commission's
proposal could achieve would be the minimum degree of protection of confidentiality.
178. In such a case, article 87 of the Treaty, as the Commission has proposed,
cannot serve as the sole legal basis. Hence, article 235 or the second indent of article
59 will also have to be invoked. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
179. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1.
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Finally, the Commission has also proposed that the protection of confidentiality will be assured not only in respect of
proceedings conducted by the Commission but also in respect
of proceedings conducted by national courts or administrative
authorities of the Member States.' 80 Given the fact that the
ultimate conclusion of these international agreements would
substantially influence the right of EEC lawyers to exercise
their profession in third countries, it is questionable whether
the Community has exclusive competence to negotiate and
conclude such agreements or, since they appear in reality to be
mixed agreements, the Community and the Member States
should be considered competent.
CONCLUSION

After two and a half years of proceedings the Court partially annulled Commission Decision 79/670 to the extent that
it demanded disclosure of the whole text of documents that
were held by the Court to be covered by the general principle
of confidentiality to Commission officials. AM & S Europe was
the first case in which the principle of protection of confidentiality came before the Court both from the point of view of substance and as to the procedure for applying it.' 8 l Given the
minimal number of cases where the question of legal privilege
arose before the AM & S case and the negligible number of
instances in which the principle of confidentiality was invoked
after the AM & S Judgment, it may be concluded that, unlike in
legal theory, the consequences of the principle of confidentiality in practice are not as important as one might originally have
thought.
The establishment of legal privilege as a principle of Com180. See COM (84) 548 final, supra note 97.
181. The Commission seems to have applied the principle of protection of confidentiality to documents exchanged between a lawyer and client in the Quinine case,
12J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 192) 5, 19 (1969); see alsoJ. TmIESING, H. SCHROTER &J.F.
HOCHBAUM, supra note 144. For unknown reasons, the question of confidentiality was
not raised when the case came before the Court ofJustice. See Boehringer Mannheim,
1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 769, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8085. A possible explanation is that the written communications exchanged
between the firm Nogentaise and its legal advisors had been previously published by
the U.S. Department ofJustice where the same international quinine cartel was also
banned. For this reason, the written communications had already lost their confidentiality when the Commission took its decision.
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munity law is a compromise between conflicting values and interests. The proper administration of justice requires, on the
one hand, that infringements of the competition rules be detected and prohibited in the interests of all. On the other
hand, the right of the individual to exercise his rights freely
implies recourse to appropriate legal advice if they are to be
safeguarded. Finally, the Court of Justice had a further difficulty to surmount: it had to reconcile the divergent national
legislations with the Community interest, the latter being expressed and fostered in the unremitting and long-term process
of European integration.

